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RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERACTION OF FACT
AND PERCEPTION*
David C. Baldus**
George Woodworth***
INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on the interaction between the empirical evi-
dence of racial discrimination in the administration of the death pen-
alty, community perceptions of the existence of such discrimination,
and the impact of those perceptions on the perceived legitimacy of
capital punishment.
Our analysis builds on the usual distinction between race-of-defen-
dant and race-of-victim discrimination.1 Both forms of discrimination
violate the principle of "comparative justice," which requires compa-
rable treatment of offenders who are similarly situated in terms of
criminal culpability and deathworthiness. 2 Racially discriminatory ad-
ministration of the death penalty violates comparative justice because
it: (a) differentiates among offenders on the basis of morally and le-
gally irrelevant factors, and (b) results in the similar treatment of of-
fenders who materially differ in terms of their criminal culpability.3
* We acknowledge with thanks the many helpful suggestions and comments on an earlier
draft of this Article by Catherine M. Grosso, Robert F. Schopp, Gerald B. Wetlaufer, and David
Zuckerman. Beau Brindley, Jeffrey L. Powell, and Ryan S. Struve provided valuable research
assistance. We are also grateful for data and advice from Dale Jones, Mark H. Friedman, and
Vance Hagins for the New Jersey segment of the Article and from Susan Balliet, Joseph Hood,
Edward C. Monahan, and Bette Niemi for the Kentucky segment of the Article.
** Joseph B. Tye Professor, College of Law, University of Iowa
* Professor, Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Iowa
1. Race-of-defendant discrimination refers to the more punitive charging and sentencing deci-
sions of black or Hispanic offenders because of their race or ethnicity, while race-of-victim dis-
crimination refers to the more punitive treatment of offenders whose victims are white.
2. Robert F. Schopp, Justifying Capital Punishment in Principle and in Practice: Empirical
Evidence of Distortions in Application, 81 NEB. L. REV. 805, 826-27 (2002) ("Dissimilar treat-
ment" of similarly situated offenders constitutes "comparative injustice," as does "similar treat-
ment of those" who materially differ in terms of their criminal culpability and deathworthiness.).
In contrast to comparative justice, "noncomparative justice requires that each individual receive
treatment appropriate to that individual's merit or desert." Id. at 826.
3. Schopp, supra note 2, at 827. Schopp stated:
1411
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
This Article also builds upon the distinction between purposeful
discrimination (conscious and unconscious) and the differential treat-
ment of defendants flowing from the evenhanded application of race-
neutral policies and practices. 4 In the controlling law, purposeful dis-
crimination is known as "disparate treatment," while noninvidious ra-
cial disparities are characterized as "disparate impact."
In terms of proof of discrimination, our focus is on statistical evi-
dence of systemic patterns and practices of discrimination, which
would not appear in the data in the absence of race-based disparate
treatment in a significant number of cases. The absence of systemic
evidence of disparate treatment does not mean, however, that a sys-
tem is free of all purposeful discrimination. It means only that to the
extent race-based disparate treatment does exist, it is not sufficiently
pervasive to be detected as a significant factor in a statistical analysis.
In terms of community perceptions of the death penalty, we distin-
guish between the general public, which perceives death penalty issues
only dimly, if at all, and the attentive public of judges, prosecutors,
politicians, academics, activists, and other observers who follow these
issues more closely.5 These two populations differ principally in terms
of their motivation to understand the system and their knowledge
about how it actually functions.
There are five main themes in this Article. The first is that empiri-
cal evidence generally suggests that the United States death penalty
system is no longer characterized by the systemic discrimination
against black defendants that existed in many states before Furman v.
Georgia.6 It reveals that while the discriminatory application of the
death-penalty against black defendants (and defendants whose victims
are white) continues to occur in some places, it does not appear to be
inherent in the system-in other words, race-of-defendant discrimina-
tion is not an inevitable feature of all post-Furman death sentencing
[1]t is precisely because comparative justice requires consistent application to the stan-
dards of noncomparative justice that either dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar
cases or similar treatment of relevantly dissimilar cases violates comparative justice.
Either pattern reveals a failure to consistently apply the relevant criteria of justice, and
either pattern thus reveals a failure to accurately apply the criteria of noncomparative
justice to at least some of the cases.
Id.
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
5. This distinction resonates in the political science literature. See C. JOHN ZALLER, THE
NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 6 (1992) (contrasting the general public with political
"elites," defined as "politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and
many kinds of experts and policy specialists"). See also V.O. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1961); V.O. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 2 (1966).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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systems. Notwithstanding this evidence, the general public continues
to believe that the pre-Furman pattern of widespread race-of-defen-
dant discrimination continues in the post-Furman period. This per-
ception does not, however, materially affect the perceived legitimacy
of capital punishment in the eyes of the general public.
Our second theme is that the attentive public, which generally per-
ceives race-of-defendant discrimination to be both immoral and un-
constitutional, correctly perceives the decline of systemic race-of-
defendant discrimination in the post-Furman period. This post-
Furman improvement adds legitimacy to the current system. Moreo-
ver, in the few instances in which race-of-defendant discrimination has
been documented, that evidence has generated calls for reform to
ameliorate the problem.
Our third theme is that the empirical evidence supports a judgment
that race-of-victim discrimination, which characterized many pre-
Furman systems, also appears to characterize many, but not all, post-
Furman systems. Although this form of discrimination is unknown to
the general public, it is generally understood among the attentive
public.
However, there are conflicting opinions among prosecutors, courts,
scholars, and other observers about the significance of the race-of-vic-
tim disparities documented in the literature. Some people, including
the authors of this Article, believe that, when established, its persis-
tence significantly impairs the legitimacy of a system. Others believe
that such discrimination cannot be reliably established, or that it is not
a matter of moral or serious constitutional concern. Yet others be-
lieve that tolerance of race discrimination, particularly race-of-victim
discrimination, is a necessary evil required to preserve the benefits of
capital punishment (the "necessity hypothesis"). Two beliefs underlie
this hypothesis. The first is that race discrimination is inevitable and
widespread in the system. The second is that all efforts to prevent or
remedy the effects of race discrimination will eviscerate the use of
capital punishment.
The fourth theme of this Article is that the available evidence from
the post-Furman period draws into serious question the validity of
both these beliefs. As noted above, the post-Furman evidence is quite
inconsistent with the inevitability hypothesis. In addition, the post-
Furman experience indicates that a number of procedures have the
capacity to reduce the risk of discriminatory application of the death
penalty without eviscerating capital punishment.
Our final theme concerns the moral implications of ignoring the risk
of discrimination in a death penalty system. Experience has shown
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that the only way to determine if a risk of race discrimination exists in
a given death-sentencing jurisdiction is through the conduct of a well-
controlled study of its capital charging and sentencing system. In the
absence of results from such a study documenting the absence of any
risk of race discrimination, a cloud of moral uncertainty hangs over
the system and its legitimacy depends significantly on the extent to
which it applies procedures to limit death sentencing to the most ag-
gravated cases and provides defendants the opportunity to present
race claims for adjudication under reasonable standards of review.
Part II summarizes the empirical evidence of race discrimination in
the administration of the death penalty before and after Furman v.
Georgia. Part III examines the impact of that evidence on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the death penalty before and after Furman. We
also develop the argument that, when it exists, race-of-victim discrimi-
nation is both unconstitutional and immoral. In Part IV, we rethink
the "necessity" of tolerating race discrimination through an analysis of
evidence from the post-Furman period, which undermines the argu-
ment that such toleration is a necessary evil required to maintain the
benefits of capital punishment. Part V presents our conclusions, while
Part VI summarizes in detail the Article's principal findings and con-
clusions. The Appendix provides additional information on the em-
pirical findings reported in Part II.
II. EVIDENCE OF RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE USE OF THE
DEATH PENALTY BEFORE AND AFTER FURMAN V.
GEORGIA (1972)
In this section, we summarize the evidence of race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim discrimination in the administration of the death pen-
alty before and after Furman v. Georgia. For both forms of discrimi-
nation, we distinguish between race disparities in actual executions
and in the imposition of death sentences, many of which will never be
executed.
Readers who are familiar with the evidence of race discrimination
in the use of the death penalty may elect to pass over this section and
pick up our analysis of the impact this evidence has on the perceived
legitimacy of capital punishment, which commences in Part III.
The short story of this section is that pre-Furman there was evi-
dence of widespread race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimina-
tion, particularly in the South. The evidence from the post-Furman
period tells a different story. It reveals that while the discriminatory
application of the death penalty continues to occur in some places, it
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does not appear to be inherent in the system, in other words, it is not
an inevitable feature of all post-Furman death-sentencing systems.
A. Race-of-Defendant Discrimination
1. Pre-Furman
Prior to Furman, 49% (1630/3334) of the murder defendants exe-
cuted in the United States were black; in southern jurisdictions, the
percentage of blacks among those executed reached 70%. Moreover,
89% (405/455) of the persons executed for the crime of rape were
black. 7
There was a similar pattern in the imposition of death sentences,
which can be seen in the best-controlled pre-Furman study of death
sentencing in murder prosecutions in a southern jurisdiction. 8 It cov-
ered the three-year period in Georgia before Furman. The results
7. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). From 1930 to 1968, the year of
the last pre-Furman execution, blacks represented 49% (1630/3334) of defendants executed for
murder and 89% (405/455) of defendants executed for rape. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Execution:
1930-68, NAT'L PRISONER STAT. BULL., Aug. 1968, at 11 (Of the 2,306 individuals executed in
the South from 1930-1968, 72% were blacks.). Evidence of race-of-defendant disparities is also
documented in the most extensive database on executions. Developed by Watt Espy, it docu-
ments over 18,000 executions since the founding of the nation. In the South during that time,
67% of those executed for murder (n = 2703) were black and 90% of those executed for rape (n
= 678) were black. VIcTORIA SCHNEIDER & JOHN ORITZ SMYKLA, A Summary Analysis of Ex-
ecutions in the United States, 1608-1987: The Espy File, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
CURRENT RESEARCH 12 tbl. 1.5 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991).
From 1900 to 1950, the percentage of blacks executed for murder in the South ranged from
80% in the first decade to 71% in the 1940s. In the 1950s it declined to 57%. Id. As indicated in
Table 2 infra, since Furman, in the eleven southern states that have carried out executions, the
proportion of blacks among those executed is 40%. Only Alabama has more than 50% black
among those executed--64% (16/25). For the other southern states (Texas, Virginia, Missouri,
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Mississippi), the
range is from 21% to 48%. Id.
In the rest of the nation (North and West) throughout the nation's history, blacks constituted
19% of those executed for murder (n = 634) and 63% of those executed for rape (n = 36). As
indicated in Table 1.5 of Schneider & Smykla, supra, in the post-Furman period, the average
proportion of blacks executed in northern and western states (Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) for murder
is 16%. The range is from 0% to 67%.
8. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 141 tbl. 26 (1990).
Pre-Furman studies from individual southern jurisdictions in the 1930s and 1940s also supported
the perception of race-of-defendant discrimination. Id. at 248-53. A major exception to the
trend of documentation found in the pre-Furman studies is documented in Special Issue, A Study
of The California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297, 1368-78
(1967) (no evidence of race-of-defendant or race-of-victim effects in an analysis of 238 penalty
trials between 1958 and 1966).
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shown in Table 1 document a strong black-defendant "main" effect. 9
The unadjusted data shown in Part A of the Table indicate that,
among death-eligible defendants convicted in jury trials, blacks were
twice as likely as whites to be sentenced to death-19% versus 8%-
an outcome that reflected both prosecutorial decisions to seek and
jury decisions to impose death sentences.10 Part C of Table 1 indi-
cates that
TABLE 1. PRE-FURMAN UNADJUSTED RACE-OF-DEFENDANT AND
RACE-OF-VIcTIM DISPARITIES IN GEORGIA STATEWIDE DEATH-
SENTENCING RATES: 19 69 -7 2 a
A. Race of Defendant
Black .19 (35/182)
White .08 (9/112)
Difference 11 pts.
Ratio 2.4
B. Race of Victim
White .18 (32/179)
Black .10 (12/115)
Difference 8 pts.
Ratio 1.8
C. Defendant/Victim Racial Combination
1. Black defendant/white victim .31 (24/77)
2. White defendant/white victim .08 (8/102)
3. Black defendant/black victim .10 (11/105)
4. White defendant/black victim .10 (1/10)
a Source: BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 141 tbl. 26.
black on white killings were treated most severely (31%). Neverthe-
less, black on black murders were at higher risk of a death sentence
(10%) than the average white defendant murder (8%). In a mul-
tivariate logistic regression analysis, which controlled for the criminal
9. A "main" effect operates more or less uniformly across all classes of cases, in other words,
the magnitude of the effect is roughly the same regardless of the other facts of the cases. Thus, a
black defendant main effect would be characterized by a higher death sentencing risk for black
defendants than the risk faced by similarly situated white defendants, without regard for race of
the victim. Under such a system, we would see, as we do in the pre-Furman data, a higher risk of
a death sentence for black defendants with black victims than the risk faced by white defendants
whose victims are white.
10. "Unadjusted" disparities reflect differences in charging and sentencing rates for different
racial groups of offenders without regard to other factors or determinants that may influence
sentencing outcome, such as the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the cases. "Ad-
justed" disparities, in contrast, compare disparities after taking into account or controlling for
other important outcome determinants in "multivariate" statistical procedures such as crosstabu-
lar and multiple regression analyses.
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culpability of all of the defendants, the average black offender's odds
of receiving a death sentence were twelve times higher (p =.002) than
the odds faced by a similarly situated white defendant.11 Appendix
Figure 3 provides additional detail on the multivariate results.
2. Post-Furman
a. The Unadjusted Data
Table 2 presents an overview of executions by states in the post-
Furman period. The bottom line indicates that 35% of those executed
since Furman have been black. Forty-three percent of those now on
death row are black. 12 These are much lower numbers than we saw in
the pre-Furman period.
Compared to the 13% of the total United States population that is
black, the 35% figure seems high. This is a spurious comparison be-
cause well over 50% of the death-eligible population in most states
with large numbers of homicides is black.13 For example, in Georgia
from 1973 through 1980, 67% of the death-eligible population was
black, and in Maryland from 1978 through 1999, the figure was 74%.14
Given the composition of the death-eligible population, does the 35%
figure suggest that white defendants are being treated more punitively
than black defendants? If that is not the case, what explains the ap-
parent "under-representation" of blacks on death row? The answer is
the prevalence of race-of-victim discrimination. If one controls for the
race of the victim in a multivariate analysis along with the culpability
of the defendants, the data typically indicate that blacks, as a group,
are treated the same as whites or slightly more harshly, although the
black-defendant disparities are not statistically significant. 15 Appen-
11. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 599 col. A ("Odds Multiplier").
12. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 1, 7 (2002), available at http://
www.naacpldf.org/pdfdocs/deathrow_%20fa12002.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
13. A homicide is death-eligible if it meets the culpability requirements for capital murder
(generally common-law murder or first-degree murder) and one or more statutorily defined ag-
gravating circumstances is present in the case. Those factors include circumstances, such as a
police officer victim, a contemporaneous felony (e.g., a robbery, rape, burglary, or murder-for-
hire), or circumstances that are heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Nationwide, blacks constitute
more than 50% of those arrested for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, at 354 tbl. 4.10 (1999).
14. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 562 (Georgia); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT
BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT
TO THE INFLUENCES OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 45 fig. 2 (2003) (Final Report), availa-
ble at http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
15. See infra notes 23 and 138 for an explanation of how race-of-victim discrimination biases
downward the death-sentencing rate for black defendants.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1411
TABLE 2. POST-FURMAN EXECUTION BY RACE OF DEFENDANT:
1976-2002a
A B
State Black Defendant Percentage
1. Texas 34% (9 7/2 89)b
2. Virginia 48% (42/87)
3. Missouri 37% (22/59)
4. Oklahoma 24% (13/55)
5. Florida 31% (17/54)
6. Georgia 42% (13/31)
7. South Carolina 41% (11/27)
8. Louisiana 48% (13/27)
9. Alabama 64% (16/25)
10. Arkansas 21% (5/24)
11. North Carolina 26% (6/23)
12. Arizona 0% (0/22)
13. Delaware 46% (6/13)
14. Illinois 42% (5/12)
15. California 10% (1/10)
16. Indiana 33% (3/9)
17. Nevada 0% (0/9)
18. Mississippi 50% (3/6)
19. Utah 33% (2/6)
20. Ohio 40% (2/5)
21. Washington 0% (0/4)
22. Nebraska 67% (2/3)
23. Maryland 67% (2/3)
24. Pennsylvania 0% (0/3)
25. Kentucky 0% (0/2)
26. Montana 0% (0/2)
27. Oregon 0% (0/2)
28. U.S. 0% (0/2)
29. Colorado 0% (0/1)
30. Idaho 0% (0/1)
31. New Mexico 0% (0/1)
32. Tennessee 0% (0/1)
33. Wyoming 0% (0/1)
TOTAL 34.27% (281/820)
The jurisdictions are listed in order of the total number of executions.
The denominator is the number of executions. The numerator is the number of blacks
executed.
Source: NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 8-9 (2003), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/deathrow-winter2003.pdf (last visited June 4,
2004).
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dix Table 1 provides more detail on the unadjusted post-Furman
death-sentencing rates in Georgia and Maryland.
b. The Adjusted Data
Over twenty post-Furman studies have focused on race-of-defen-
dant discrimination in the use of the death penalty. Much of the re-
search is not well controlled, and the results appear to be very
dependent on local politics, crime rates, public opinion about crime
and punishment, jury selection procedures, capital charging and sen-
tencing processes, and the presence or absence of measures developed
to limit the risk of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, none of the
studies document a statewide main black-defendant effect among all
death-eligible cases, which one would see if blacks were systemically
treated more punitively than similarly situated white defendants. On
the issue of race-of-defendant discrimination, a 1990 General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) study concluded:
The evidence for the influence of the race-of-defendant on death
penalty outcomes was equivocal. Although more than half of the
studies found that race-of-defendant influenced the likelihood of
being charged with a capital crime or receiving the death penalty,
the relationship between race-of-defendant and outcome varied
across studies. For example, sometimes the race-of-defendant inter-
acted with other factors. In one study, researchers found that in ru-
ral areas black defendants were more likely to receive death
sentences, and in urban areas white defendants were more likely to
receive death sentences. In a few studies, analyses revealed that the
black defendant/white victim combination was the most likely to re-
ceive the death penalty. However, the extent to which the finding
was influenced by race-of-victim rather than race-of-defendant was
unclear. 16
The results of the empirical research since 1990 are comparable. 17
These findings may come as a surprise to some, but they hold over a
long period of time in places as diverse and southern as Mississippi,
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Missouri, Texas,
and Virginia, as well in such states as Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois,
Nebraska, and California.18 They will not, however, support a conclu-
16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6, (GAO/GGD - 90 - 57, 1990) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
17. David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990
Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003).
18. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 254-65 (pre-1990 studies); Appendix Figure 4 (reporting a
core finding of the Georgia research); Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 17, at 215-25 (post-1990
studies); Glen L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on
Death Sentencing in California: 1990-1999 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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sion that race-of-defendant effects do not exist in these systems. For
one thing, to the extent their findings are based on statewide data,
which most are, they may be masking black-defendant effects in some
regions of the state that are offset by white-defendant effects in other
parts of the state. 19 In addition, reports of experienced practitioners,
particularly in southern jurisdictions, document many instances of ra-
cial insensitivity and outright bigotry, especially in the selection of ju-
ries in capital cases.20
A handful of studies suggest that, statewide, black defendants with
white victims are treated more punitively than all defendants with dif-
ferent defendant/victim racial combinations.21 The question is the ex-
tent to which the disparities in those cases are driven by race-of-victim
or race-of-defendant discrimination. Appendix Figure 2 and the text
accompanying it explore the issue in further detail.
The only strong black-defendant main effect in the states has been
detected in Philadelphia County penalty trials-and there it is princi-
pally seen in the weighing stage of the jury penalty trials.2 2 Appendix
19. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 180 tbl. 42 (Post-Furman Georgia data from the
1970s documents black-defendant disparities in charging and sentencing decisions in rural areas,
which are offset in a statewide analysis by the more lenient treatment of black defendants in
urban areas.). Similarly, the race-of-defendant effects that we document for Philadelphia
County at the final weighing stage of penalty trial decision making (Baldus et al., infra note 22)
would likely be offset by an analysis of death sentencing statewide in Pennsylvania.
20. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Toler-
ance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 512 (1994) (quoting a
Florida judge: "Since the nigger mom and dad are here anyway, why don't we go ahead and do
the penalty phase today .. "). The literature suggests that race discrimination is most deeply
embedded in jury selection practices that are designed to hold black jurors to a bare minimum.
Id. at 515-27. Race discrimination in the use of peremptories is not limited to Southern jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) (documenting pervasive
evidence of race discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges in 317 post-Furman Phila-
delphia capital murder trials).
21. Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials:
1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 1(1995); PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14, at 65 tbl.
7C, 88-96 tbls. 13A-13G (Maryland). See also Appendix Figure 2 (Maryland).
22. See supra note 9 for a description of a main statistical effect. However, nationwide there
have been only ten well-controlled studies (adjustment for 15 or more controls) (California,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina). Less well-controlled (from 4 to 10 controls) but very inform-
ative studies have also been conducted in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Texas. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH &
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989) (Arkansas and
Oklahoma); Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 17, at 215-26 (Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and
Texas). There are also race-of-defendant and race-of-victim disparities reported with no adjust-
ment or adjustment for only a single control variable (over varying time periods of time). Baldus
& Woodworth, supra note 17, at 217, 224-25 (Indiana and the federal death sentencing system)
and David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:
1420
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Figure 3 and the text accompanying it present more detail on these
findings. In a multivariate analysis of these data, which controls for all
of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the odds of
the average black defendant receiving a death sentence were 3.8 times
higher than the odds faced by a similarly culpable nonblack defen-
dant. A comparison of the adjusted probabilities indicates that the
black defendants were two to three times more likely to be sentenced
to death.
Interestingly, the race-of-defendant effects that we documented in
Philadelphia are the product of jury decision making. Our analysis of
prosecutorial decision making in Philadelphia revealed no race-of-de-
fendant effects at all. This is the clear national pattern, although, as
the data from Maryland make clear, in some states, among white-vic-
tim cases, black defendants run a higher risk of being capitally
charged and sentenced to death than white defendants.
These data suggest that in the post-Furman period, from a systemic
perspective, substantially equal treatment of black and nonblack of-
fenders is now the rule rather than the exception.2 3 One explanation
for this change may be that prosecutors are striving for equal treat-
ment. Indeed, the level of sensitivity on this issue on the part of pros-
ecutors is suggested by evidence from Kentucky that some defense
counsel there are reluctant to raise claims of race-of-defendant dis-
crimination under the state's Racial Justice Act in prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions.24 The reluctance arises from the deep resentment such
claims produce on the part of prosecutors and a fear that the claims
may damage defense counsel's long-term relationships with the prose-
cutors with whom they must work on a daily basis. 25 There are at
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1638, 1742-45 app. B (1998) (Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington).
23. We noted above, supra note 19, however, that statewide data may mask race-of-defendant
discrimination in certain locales that is offset when it is included in a larger statewide analysis.
Also, when the evidence is limited to unadjusted race-of-defendant disparities, in many jurisdic-
tions, the race effects are biased in the direction of suggesting less punitive treatment of black
defendants because of the impact of race-of-victim discrimination on the unadjusted disparities.
That bias disappears when controls for defendant criminal culpability are introduced into the
analysis. Those analyses generally show, in the aggregate, no race-of-defendant effects. See infra
note 139.
24. Gerald A. Neal, Not Soft on Crime, but Strong on Justice: The Kentucky Racial Justice Act,
THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2004, at 9 (reporting the results of a survey of sixty-four Kentucky public
defenders on the use of the state's 1998 Racial Justice Act), available at http://dpa.ky.govllibraryl
advocate/mar04/mar04.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
25. This prosecutorial sensitivity appears to reflect what Randall Kennedy refers to as "[olne
of the great achievements of social reforms in American history ... the stigmatization of overt
racial prejudice ... [and] the sense that racial discrimination is a terrible evil .... Randall L.
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least three other possible explanations for the apparent decline of
race-of-defendant discrimination in the system. First, it may reflect
increased participation of African Americans in the criminal justice
system as prosecutors, judges, and jurors.2 6 Second, indigent black
capital defendants may be receiving better legal representation. In-
creasingly, public defenders are assuming larger homicide caseloads
and bringing institutional expertise and resources to the job that are
not available to court-appointed, private counsel. Finally,
prosecutorial discretion may be reflecting a perception in many juris-
dictions that, unless a black-defendant/black-victim case is highly ag-
gravated, it is likely to result in a jury verdict of life imprisonment,
thus prompting the prosecution to rethink the effort and expense.
The only exception to the absence of a black-defendant effect in
prosecutorial decision-making is in the federal death penalty. Data
from Janet Reno's years as Attorney General (AG) indicate that
among the cases in which she approved a death sentence, white de-
fendants were twenty percentage points (47% (24/51) versus 27% (28/
105)) more likely than black defendants to obtain a pretrial waiver of
the death penalty by virtue of a plea agreement with the local United
States Attorney.27 Although this is an unadjusted race effect, it ap-
pears to have been of sufficient concern to prompt Attorney General
John Ashcroft to amend departmental rules to require that once he
has authorized a capital prosecution, the death penalty may not be
waived thereafter by the local United States Attorney without his
prior approval. 28
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1388, 1418 (1988). This transformation leads legal philosopher Michael Moore to conclude
that "[slome emotions such as racial prejudice have negative moral worth in the sense that to
have them is to be a morally worse (less virtuous) person." MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 119 (1997). Stigmatization concerns also deter
judges from "finding" purposeful discrimination "in all but the clearest circumstances." Ken-
nedy, supra, at 1418. Blume et al., infra note 91, documents a similar reluctance of both state
and federal judges to find discrimination on the part of prosecutors.
26. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 183-84 (analysis of declining levels of race-of-defen-
dant discrimination in Georgia after Furman v. Georgia, beginning in urban areas and spreading
later to rural areas).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: 1988-2000,
at 34-35 tbl. 2A (2000), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html (last visited Apr.
19, 2004).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA:
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW 17-19 (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/gag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004). The report
states, however, that the disparity is not evidence of disparate treatment because a consideration
of all of the U.S. Attorney decisions indicates that "noncapital treatment" occurs for 74% of the
white defendants and 81% of the black defendants. Id. at 18.
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B. Race-of-Victim Discrimination
1. Pre-Furman
Before Furman, the issue of race-of-victim discrimination attracted
little attention. In the popular mind, race discrimination meant one
thing-more punitive treatment of black defendants. Nevertheless,
the pre-Furman research also documents strong race-of-victim effects
(i.e., killers of whites were at far greater risk of a death sentence than
killers of blacks). For example, in the pre-Furman Georgia research
noted above in Table 1, the unadjusted death-sentencing rate in white-
victim cases was 18% compared to 10% in the black-victim cases.2 9
Moreover, in a multivariate logistic regression analysis, the data sug-
gested that defendants' odds of receiving a death sentence were 4.3
times higher if their victims were white than the odds faced by simi-
larly situated defendants with black victims. 30
2. Post-Furman
Table 3 presents nationwide race-of-victim data on the murder de-
fendants executed post-Furman. The bottom line indicates that 81%
of the executed defendants had white victims. The proportion of
white-victim cases among all death-sentenced, as contrasted to exe-
cuted, defendants is also known in eight states for the period from
1977 through 2000. 31 With the exception of Pennsylvania, the aver-
age white-victim rate among death-sentenced offenders is 83% and
ranges from 85% in Arizona to 82% in Virginia, while the percentage
of white-victim cases among all murder and nonnegligent manslaugh-
ter cases averaged 45% and ranged from 31% in Georgia to 73% in
Nevada.
In Pennsylvania, in contrast, the white-victim rate among death-sen-
tenced offenders is 54% compared to a rate of 43% among all murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter cases. The much lower unadjusted
race-of-victim effect in Pennsylvania reflects the high death-sentenc-
ing rate in Philadelphia's black-defendant/black-victim cases. 32 Na-
29. See Table 1.
30. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 143. See Appendix Figure 1 and accompanying text for
more detail on the pre-Furman race-of-victim effects in Georgia. Studies in other states during
the 1930s to the 1960s reported unadjusted race-of-victim effects in North Carolina and New
Jersey. Id at 249-51.
31. John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 197 (2004) (Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia).
32. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Philadelphia accounts for 54% (124/229) of the
state's current death row population, see PERSONS SENTENCED TO EXECUTION IN PENN-
SYLVANIA AS OF MAY 4, 2004, available at http://www.cor.state.pa.us/Execution%201ist.pdf (last
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TABLE 3. POST-FURMAN EXECUTIONS BY RACE OF
VICTIM: 1976-2002a
A B
State White Victim Percentage
1. Texas 79% (229/289) b
2 Virginia 80% (70/87)
3. Missouri 78% (46/59)
4. Oklahoma 78% (43/55)
5. Florida 80% (43/54)
6. Georgia 94% (29/31)
7. South Carolina 64% (18/28)
8. Louisiana 81% (22/27)
9. Alabama 76% (19/25)
10. Arkansas 92% (22/24)
11. North Carolina 87% (20/23)
12. Arizona 86% (19/22)
13. Delaware 69% (9/13)
14. Illinois 75% (9/12)
15. California 80% (8/10)
16. Indiana 89% (8/9)
17. Nevada 100% (9/9)
18. Mississippi 67% (4/6)
19. Utah 100% (6/6)
20. Ohio 80% (4/5)
21. Washington 100% (4/4)
22. Nebraska 100% (3/3)
23. Maryland 100% (3/3)
24. Pennsylvania 67% (2/3)
25. Kentucky 100% (2/2)
26. Montana 100% (2/2)
27. Oregon 100% (2/2)
28. U.S. 0% (0/2)
29. Colorado 100% (1/1)
30. Idaho 100% (1/1)
31. New Mexico 100% (1/1)
32. Tennessee 100% (1/1)
33. Wyoming 100% (1/1)
TOTAL 80.88% (1007/1245)
a The jurisdictions are listed in the order of the total number of executions.
b The denominator is the total number of executions. The numerator is the number of executed
defendants with one or more white victims in their cases.
Source: NAACP LEGAL DEE. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 8-9 (2003), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/deathrow-winter2003.pdf (last visited June 4,
2004).
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tionwide, the proportion of white-victim cases among all murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter cases has ranged between 51% and 56%
since 1976.33 These data strongly suggest that defendants with white
victims are at a significantly higher risk of being sentenced to death
and executed than are defendants whose victims are black, Asian, or
Hispanic.
In post-Furman multivariate studies designed to explain this white-
victim phenomenon, the introduction of controls for offender criminal
culpability and geography generally reduces the magnitude of the
race-of-victim effects, but it does not explain it away completely. For
example, in the recent Paternoster and Brame study of the rates that
Maryland prosecutors gave notice of an intention to seek a death sen-
tence in the cases, the unadjusted race-of-victim disparity of twenty-
six percentage points remained at ten points after adjustment for of-
fender culpability and geography.34
The GAO's synthesis of research prior to 1990 offered the following
assessment of the empirical findings:
In 82% of the studies, race-of-victim was found to influence the
likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving a death
sentence, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be more
likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks.
This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data
collection methods, and analytic techniques. The finding held for
high, medium, and low quality studies.
The race-of-victim influence was found at all stages of the criminal
justice system process, although there were variations among stud-
ies as to whether there was a race-of-victim influence at specific
stages. The evidence for the race-of-victim influence was stronger
for the earlier stages of the judicial process (e.g., prosecutorial deci-
sion to charge defendants with a capital offense, decision to proceed
to trial rather than plea bargain) than in later stages. This was be-
cause the earlier stages were omprised of larger samples allowing
for more rigorous analyses.[35] However, decisions made at every
stage of the process necessarily affect an individual's likelihood of
being sentenced to death.36
visited May 8 2004). In the Georgia 1973-1980 data referred to above, among all death-eligible
cases, the proportion of white-victim cases was 40% and in the Maryland study referred to
above, the figure was 45%. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 564 (Georgia); PATERNOSTER &
BRAME, supra note 14, at 47 fig. 4 (Maryland).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 301 tbl. 3.142.
34. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14, at 86 tbl. 12G.
35. In our judgment, this is one possible explanation, but it is also possible and plausible that
discrimination is greater in prosecutorial decisions because they are less constrained and less
visible than jury penalty trial decisions.
36. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 5-6.
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A recent survey we conducted of the research since 1990 reaches
the same conclusion.37 The reported studies, with varying levels of
sophistication and controls, document race-of-victim effects in Ari-
zona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, North
Carolina, and Texas.38
The literature is clear that when race-of-victim disparities exist, the
most common source is prosecutorial charging decisions. However,
recent studies in Nebraska and Philadelphia showed no statistically
significant race-of-victim effects in these decisions. 39 In New Jersey,
the data suggest a race-of-victim effect in prosecutorial decisions, but
a claim based on them was rejected by the New Jersey Supreme
Court.40 Appendix Figure 4 and accompanying text present additional
detail on race-of-victim effects in our post-Furman Georgia research.
III. RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE PERCEIVED MORALITY AND
LEGITIMACY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Conceptual Framework
To analyze the impact of race discrimination on the perceived mo-
rality and legitimacy of the death penalty, we turned to a multidiscipli-
nary body of research that addresses the legitimacy of legal
institutions and policies. Much of this research focuses on the extent
to which perceptions of the legitimacy of laws affect citizen compli-
ance with them. 41 Our focus, in contrast, is on whether the law is per-
37. Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 17, at 202.
38. Id. at 215-26. Prosecutorial white-victim disparities were also documented in New Jersey
and Virginia in multivariate analyses, but they were not statistically significant in Virginia, id. at
524, or considered sufficiently strong to justify judicial relief in New Jersey, infra note 250. A 20-
percentage point white-victim disparity (33% versus 19%) in death sentencing rates in the major
urban counties of Nebraska has been documented but it is not statistically significant. David C.
Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REv. 486, 582-
83 fig. 13 (2002).
39. Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 553 tbl. 4 (results of logistic multiple regression analysis of
Nebraska data); Baldus et al., supra note 22, at 1679 tbl. 2 (unadjusted disparities and regression
analyses showed no effects in Philadelphia).
40. State v. Morton, 757 A.2d 184, 268 (N.J. 2000) (considering a statewide race of victim
claim in prosecutorial decisions to seek death based on a 20-percentage point (50% to 30%)
unadjusted race-of-victim disparity and the results of regression models documenting statistically
significant effects, but holding that the data did not "relentlessly document systemic racial dis-
crimination"). But see infra note 247 for a dissenting Justice's view of the significance of the
findings. See also Judge David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New Jersey
Experience, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 227 (2003).
41. This is known as the "sociological" notion of legitimacy. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitch-
ell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Su-
preme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 711 n.25 (1994).
[Vol. 53:14111426
2004] THE INTERACTION OF FACT AND PERCEPTION 1427
ceived as legitimate by the public and elites "when judged against
criteria of fairness and morality. ' 42 A straightforward approach from
this perspective is offered by political scientists Robert Dahl and
Charles Lindblom. In their view, the perceived legitimacy of a gov-
ernmental policy and its consequences reflects the extent to which
they are approved or regarded as "right. ' 43 The norms that inform
these judgments range from "conscious, articulated, logically struc-
tured" legal norms to norms with "less logical structure" that support
a "feeling" of what is "right and wrong in a given instance. 44
This theory suggests that perceptions of the legitimacy of public pol-
icies are affected by the salience of the moral and legal values impli-
cated by the evidence. With respect to capital punishment, race
discrimination implicates important costs and benefits at two levels-
those associated with the existence of racial discrimination and those
associated with its prevention and cure.
With respect to the existence of racial discrimination, costs come in
two forms. The first concerns threats to principles of comparative jus-
tice and equal protection. 45 The second concerns the extent to which
discrimination impairs the protection of innocent life and retribu-
tion-the two most significant justifications of capital punishment in
principle. Race-of-defendant discrimination undermines the principle
of retribution for white defendants, and it diminishes the protection
afforded their victims and the communities in which they reside, all of
which are predominantly white. When discrimination adversely af-
fects defendants whose victims are white (i.e., race-of-victim discrimi-
nation) it undermines the principle of retribution for defendants
whose victims are black and it diminishes the protection afforded their
42. This is known as the philosophical notion of legitimacy. Id.
43. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 114-15
(1963). A similar sense of the legitimacy of public policy was offered by legal realist Thurman
Arnold in the 1920s: "[L]egal institutions project values, these values are accepted by the popu-
lation because they converge with their own values, and the acceptance of these values in turn
legitimates the entire order." See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of
Law, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 379, 413.
44. DAHL & LINDBLOOM, supra note 43, at 115. See also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M.
DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1
(1995) (The average citizen's view of whether an outcome in the criminal justice is just is not
normally based on principles of "moral philosophy" but rather is based "not only on the
speaker's personal view but on an intuitive but grounded notion of justice that the speaker be-
lieves is shared by the community of moral individuals.").
45. Race discrimination in the administration of the death penalty violates both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (forbidding purposeful race discrimination)
and the Eighth Amendment (race discrimination is a form of arbitrariness because decisions are
based on irrelevant factors). McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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victims and the communities in which they reside, all of whom are
predominantly black.46
There are also costs and benefits associated with the prevention of
discrimination, and its cure, when it is shown to exist. If the costs of
prevention and cure come at too high a price in terms of the justifica-
tion for capital punishment in principle, from a moral standpoint, tol-
erance of discrimination may appear to be a more acceptable
alternative than either its prevention or cure. However, if prevention
and cure do not materially impair the goals of capital punishment, tol-
erance of discrimination may significantly impair the legitimacy of a
system that tolerates race discrimination. The issue, therefore, is the
extent to which strategies designed to prevent and cure discrimination
(a) achieve those objectives, (b) undermine retribution and the pro-
tection of innocent life, and (c) introduce additional threats to princi-
ples of comparative justice and equal protection. 47
Our approach to the issue assumes the legitimacy of the theories
offered to justify capital punishment in principle. If one were to reject
their legitimacy, evidence of race discrimination in a death penalty
system would make a bad system worse and offer little to the norma-
tive analysis. 48 Similarly, if one rejects the legitimacy of Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendment values of comparative justice and nonarbi-
trary application of the death penalty, evidence of race discrimination
will have no impact at all on one's perception of the legitimacy of the
death penalty.
Perceptions of legitimacy are also influenced by legal discourse and
doctrine, particularly in the United States Supreme Court, which, in
the eyes of different publics, may be seen as approving existing social
practice and public policy.49 For example, Alan Freeman presents a
convincing argument that much of the Supreme Court's interpretation
46. A comparable model underlies Justice Blackmun's analysis in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), wherein he concluded that the costs associated with dis-
tortions in the application of the death penalty (miscarriages of justice, unreliability, and discrim-
ination) outweigh the justifications for capital punishment, which he continued to accept as
legitimate. Scott Turow reached a similar conclusion in which he accepted the validity of the
goals of capital punishment but concluded that the costs associated with distortions in applica-
tion, including but not limited to race discrimination, overwhelmed the benefits associated with
it in cases where it was clearly justified in the interests of retribution. See Sco-r TUROW, ULTI-
MATE PUNISHMENT 113-15 (2003).
47. See Schopp, supra note 2 (reporting a formal analysis of this conceptual framework); RAN-
DALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 348 (1997) (evaluating the Racial Justice Act on
the basis of whether the "benefits of capital punishment outweigh the costs created by racial
distortions in its administration").
48. See Schopp, supra note 2, at 837.
49. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan S. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 430-31 (1995).
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of antidiscrimination law facially appears to offer meaningful justice
for racial minorities in the areas of employment, education, and voting
rights, while in fact legitimating racial inequalities in those areas of
American life.50 In a similar vein, Professors Carol S. Steiker and Jor-
dan S. Steiker argue that the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence developed since 1976 has made "actors within the crimi-
nal justice system more comfortable with their role by inducing an
exaggerated belief in the essential rationality and fairness of the sys-
tem."' 51 They also consider it "probable that death penalty law makes
members of the public at large more comfortable with the use of capi-
tal punishment than they would be in the absence of such law."52
B. The General Public
Polling data and an informal survey we conducted clearly indicate
that the general public perceives only one form of race discrimination
in the use of the death penalty-race-of-defendant discrimination,5 3 a
perception that mirrors the common understandings of the pre-
Furman system. In a 1991 poll, on the specific question of whether
blacks are at greater risk of being sentenced to death, 73% of the
black respondents and 41% of the white respondents answered in the
affirmative. 54 Yet, 67% of all respondents, and nearly 50% of black
50. Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978).
51. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 49, at 433.
52. Id. We agree with this perception and believe that the legitimization and approval of the
entire post-Furman system by the Supreme Court and the state supreme courts have greatly
contributed to the popular support for capital punishment in America since 1976.
53. In a survey we conducted in the Fall of 2003, eighty-two first-year University of Iowa law
students were asked to explain what they understood by "race discrimination in the administra-
tion of the death penalty in America." Ninety-three percent (76/82) of the students described
such discrimination strictly as race-of-defendant discrimination. The following is a typical re-
sponse: "[Tihere are disproportionately more racial minorities executed than whites. This re-
flects an apparent bias in the justice system or a willingness to prosecute, convict, and execute
minorities." Of the six students who referred to the race of the victim, it was solely with respect
to the more punitive treatment of blacks whose victims were white. Only two students referred
to race discrimination in terms of the differential treatment of defendants on the basis of the
victim's race alone.
54. The response for all respondents was 45% in agreement and 50% in disagreement. Alec
Gallup & Frank Newport, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1991, at 40, 41. Nationally, in response
to a question about whether the death penalty "is applied fairly or unfairly in this country to-
day," 53% of respondents believed that the system is applied fairly, while 40% disagreed. When
broken down by race, African Americans perceive far more inequity in the administration of the
death penalty. Nationally, 72% of African Americans-compared to only 36% of whites-be-
lieve that the system is unfair. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2001, at 145 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2002).
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respondents, "believe in" the death penalty. 55 These data are consis-
tent with the results of opinion polls that explore the reasons given for
opposition to capital punishment. In the most recent national poll
(2003), only 4% of opponents listed concerns about "unfair applica-
tion" as a reason for their opposition.56 Moreover, a 2000 poll reports
that of the 41% of the respondents who perceived its application as
unfair, 44% supported capital punishment. 57 Moreover, in a 2001
Pennsylvania poll that explored the basis of perceptions that the death
penalty is "not applied fairly," only 24% of the respondents saw the
problem of unfairness to lie in the disproportionate application of the
penalty to blacks and the poor.58
However, these polling results contain two levels of ambiguity.
First, it is unclear from the wording of the questions asked whether
the respondents who believe the death penalty is unfairly applied, but
support it, are expressing support for the death penalty as currently
practiced, or the death penalty in principle. Second, the questions
about race discrimination and unfairness are strictly descriptive, in
that they speak only to the existence of unfairness and not whether
the unfairness is wrong.59
The polling data raise two questions. First, what explains the gap
between the post-Furman empirical data documenting only spotty evi-
dence of race-of-defendant discrimination and the public perceptions
of its widespread pervasiveness in the current system? Second, what
55. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 145 tbl.
2.47 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2003) (The figures were 73% for whites, 46% for
blacks, and 63% for Hispanics.). See also Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion
on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1458-59 (1998) ("Obvi-
ously many Americans do not consider discrimination by race or wealth a sufficient reason to
oppose capital punishment."). Public support for the death penalty has waned slightly in recent
years. Overall, 77% of whites and 47% of blacks are in favor of the death penalty. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 144. Each demographic has changed in its support for the death
penalty over the last few years, from a recent high of 78% of whites and 56% of blacks support-
ing the death penalty in 1990, to recent lows of 69% and 42%, respectively, supporting the death
penalty in 2000. Id. at 143.
56. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 55. In a 1991 poll, "unfairness" was cited by 6% of the
respondents. Id. The most important reasons for opposition were, for example in the 2003 poll:
"wrong to take a life" (46%) and "person may be wrongfully convicted" (25%).
57. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Think Death Penalty Applied Fairly in This
Country, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 2000, at 64 (Among the respondents who believe the
system is fairly applied, 86% supported capital punishment.).
58. PENNSYLVANIANS UNITED AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, 2001 MORATORIUM POLL
SUMMARY AND RESULTS 6 (2001), available at http://www.pa-abolitionists.org/mora-poll.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
59. In contrast, polling questions about racial profiling in the stopping and searching of motor-
ists speak directly to the morality of the practices. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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explains the apparent indifference of the public to race discrimination
in the use of the death penalty?
1. The Gap Between the Scientific Evidence and Public Perceptions
Concerning Race-of-Defendant Discrimination
We have gained insight on this issue through the lens of knowledge
utilization theory,60 which, among other things, focuses on how people
cling to strongly held beliefs based on "ordinary knowledge" and re-
ject specialized knowledge to the contrary that is produced by social
science professionals. A very helpful synthesis of the field is Charles
Lindblom and David Cohen's book entitled, Usable Knowledge.61 A
main theme of this book concerns the extent to which specialized so-
cial science knowledge can change ordinary knowledge on which the
decisions and perceptions of most citizens and decisionmakers are
based.
Ordinary knowledge is derived from many sources that most citi-
zens would find difficult to identify. It is not directly informed by spe-
cialized knowledge and quantitative research produced by social
science. When consistent with ordinary knowledge, specialized find-
ings of social science tend to enhance the validity of ordinary knowl-
edge. However, when specialized findings are inconsistent with
ordinary knowledge, they are generally ignored or dismissed as unreli-
able or irrelevant. 62 Gaps between specialized and ordinary knowl-
edge are common phenomena in other areas of criminal law63 and in
many other public policy areas.
60. Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and Policy,
10 LAW & POL'Y 167, 184-85 (1988).
61. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979).
62. Id. at 45 (noting the "many irrational and nonrational human resistances to believing what
[professional scientific inquiry], or scientists generally, say). A substantial body of research eval-
uating the impact that social science evidence has on beliefs about the death penalty is to the
same effect. This literature tests the "Marshall hypotheses" posited by the late Supreme Court
Justice. It was his firm belief that if average citizens properly understood how the death penalty
actually functioned, most of them would reject it. The literature generally fails to support his
expectation. Moreover, it documents that "knowledge or information" can have an entirely dif-
ferent effect by polarizing opinions instead of changing them because of a process known as
"biased assimilation" in which "subjects interpreted evidence so as to maintain their initial be-
liefs." Specifically, the relevant data "are not processed impartially" and the perceived validity
of the data are "biased by the apparent consistency of [the] evidence with the perceiver's theo-
ries and expectations." Robert M. Bohm et al., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test
Of The Marshall Hypotheses, 28 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 360, 365 (1991) (summariz-
ing the literature with special reference to the work of C.G. Lord, L. Ross, and M.R. Lepper).
63. Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 754, 789
(2000) (stating that "common public misperception[s]" relate to such matters as whether crime
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The persistence of ordinary knowledge in the face of new evidence
to the contrary is particularly strong if the process or mechanism to
which the ordinary knowledge relates is widely understood. This is
particularly relevant with respect to race-of-defendant discrimination
in capital sentencing. African Americans widely believe that strident
racism in the criminal justice system flows from overt hostility to
blacks or the belief that blacks are more dangerous than nonblacks.
Many whites widely share these perceptions and can easily understand
how they would adversely affect black defendants in capital
litigation.64
Ordinary knowledge on this issue is also enhanced by arguments,
statistical and otherwise, sometimes offered to sustain the belief in
widespread discrimination against black defendants. First is the su-
perficial appeal of the commonly repeated argument that because
blacks constitute 13% of the population and 40% of the death-sen-
tenced offenders, the system is racially discriminatory. 65 The flaw in
the argument is its failure to commence the analysis with the fact that
blacks constitute more than 50% of persons arrested for death-eligible
homicide in most parts of this country. However, these statistics are
neither easily accessible nor easily interpretable.
Also important are the anecdotes of criminal law practitioners who
routinely report quite plausible examples of discrimination in the capi-
tal cases they handle. Of course, as noted above, it is clearly possible
for race-of-defendant discrimination to occur in a nonsystemic man-
ner that cannot be detected in a statistical analysis. This is one of the
big limitations of social science research. Our claim is only that race-
of-defendant discrimination is clearly not systemic throughout the
country or we would see it in the data just as we saw it in the pre-
Furman data.
A third possible explanation may be that reports of studies finding
"race discrimination," albeit race-of-victim discrimination, sustain
rates are declining, stabilizing, or increasing, the rates at which parolees become repeat offend-
ers, and "the severity of punishment that the legal system actually imposes").
64. In contrast, empirical research documenting a deterrent effect of capital punishment is
often disregarded because of a perceived implausibility that most killers conduct the kind of
cost-benefit analysis assumed by the deterrence hypotheses.
65. John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 154 (1998) characterizes this as "[t]he 'mass market' racial disparity argument," which as-
serts that "the criminal justice system is tougher on black offenders than white offenders, and
particularly is more inclined to execute blacks than whites. This argument is simple, palatable,
and easy to see."
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preexisting beliefs of discrimination against black defendants. 66 A
theory in psychology known as "pattern recognition" gives this expla-
nation credibility. The idea is that all manner of things, people, tastes,
colors, concepts, and evaluations are recognized on the basis of men-
tally inventoried prototypes. 67 When something new comes along, it is
compared to mentally inventoried prototypes to see if they match.
When a new study reports that "racial discrimination" is still at work
in the death penalty system (albeit on the basis of the victim's race), it
is understandable that it may be considered a match to the earlier
evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination. A striking example of
such a mismatch, shown in Figure 1, was contained in a political car-
toon that appeared in Atlanta, Georgia shortly after McCleskey v.
Kemp was decided in 1987. Even though the evidence of "race dis-
crimination" in McClesky was strictly on the basis of the race of the
victim, the cartoon depicted the McCleskey decision as squarely ap-
proving race-of-defendant discrimination.
FIGURE 1. POST-MCCLESKEY V. KEMP POLITICAL CARTOON, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL AND THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
(APRIL 1987)
SUPRECE COURT
66. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 4 (1997) ("Although attitudes are formed and modified by direct and indirect ex-
periences, in the area of crime and justice, the news media are predominant.").
67. See Dan K. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: A False Dichot-
omy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793, 794 (2000).
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Finally, there is compelling evidence of pockets of systemic race-of-
defendant discrimination. We see it in Philadelphia penalty trials and
in some parts of the federal system, findings which some may genera-
lize across the nation. 68 Also, the finding that black-defendant/white-
victim cases are treated more punitively than all other classes of of-
fenders in some states69 clearly reinforces the belief that blacks are
routinely treated more punitively than similarly situated whites.
2. Public Support for Capital Punishment in the Face of the
Perceptions of Widespread Race-of-Defendant
Discrimination
One possible explanation is that race discrimination is perceived to
be morally acceptable in all contexts. However, the documented pub-
lic concerns about racial profiling, noted below, suggest this is not the
case. A more plausible explanation is a belief that such discrimination
is an inevitable part of any system of justice in this country and that
any resulting harms to black victims of such discrimination are clearly
outweighed by the benefits and protections provided by the use of
capital punishment; 70 moreover, little can be done to ameliorate it,
and remedies like affirmative action will only make matters worse. 71
In 1986, Justice Antonin Scalia presented a similar hypothesis in a
memorandum to the other members of the Court (the "conference")
while McCleskey v. Kemp was under consideration. In it he wrote:
"Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sym-
pathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and
(hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70. This perception was reflected in a 1987 assessment of then Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion Director, Kent S. Scheidegger. See Kent S. Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987: The
Puzzle Nears Completion, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 95, 124 (1987). Scheidegger approves of the
McCleskey decision because "acknowledgement that some degree of racial influence is tragically
inevitable, that we must do everything we can to reduce that impact, but that amputating por-
tions of our criminal justice system is neither a necessary not a proper treatment for the disease
.... Racism is a cancer that infects all aspects of government, including the criminal justice
system. It will exist until the day the last bigot dies, a day not within the foreseeable future." Id.
71. Public perception of discrimination in society remains high. Sixty-seven percent of whites
and 82% of blacks answered in 1999 that at least some "discrimination against blacks" exists in
American society. ABC News/Lifetime Poll: Racial Discrimination (Oct. 19, 1999) (on file with
authors). However, the public in general does not see racial discrimination as a problem to
correct, as evidenced by low percentages of support for affirmative action and quota programs.
See Richard Morin & Sharon Warden, Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at Al (noting that three out of four Americans opposed affirmative action
programs); see also John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a
Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59, 64 n.15 (2001)
(noting strong public opposition to broad-based "quota" affirmative action programs).
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of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is
more proof. 72 The core of Justice Scalia's hypothesis is twofold-
inevitability and ineradicability, with a clear implication that tolera-
tion of race discrimination was acceptable given the perceived benefits
of, and public support for, the death penalty.73 From this perspective,
the distortion of race discrimination is but one factor to consider in
assessing the legitimacy and constitutionality of a death-sentencing
system.
Another likely reason for public indifference about race-of-defen-
dant discrimination is the difficulty people have in seeing highly culpa-
ble killers as "victims" of anything, combined with the belief that any
concerns one might have about such discrimination are trumped by
the importance of delivering justice in capital cases. The following
paraphrased statement by a black sheriff from Florida at a 2001 public
meeting on the issue of race and the death penalty illustrates this
point:
If a black man is guilty of capital murder and deserving of the death
penalty, it is of no concern to me that other similarly situated white
offenders avoid the death penalty. All I care about is that justice is
done in the cases that deserve the death penalty. Any relief for
such a killer on racial grounds would merely frustrate his just
deserts. 74
72. David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing and the "Improbability" of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 359, 371 n.46 (1994).
73. Justice Powell's opinion reflected this theme as well. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
312 (1987) ("Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice
system.").
74. Florida Task Force on Capital Cases, Tallahassee, Florida (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter
Florida Task Force] (Professor Baldus attended and participated in a day-long meeting of the
fifteen member panel appointed by Governor Jeb Bush, January 7, 2000.). Some intellectuals
partially share these sentiments. For example, the late Ernst Van den Haag, a philosopher, ar-
gued that race discrimination is "irrelevant" to the morality, justice, and utility of the death
penalty. Ernest Van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical and Moral Analysis,
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 323-24 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) ("[I]f the
death penalty is morally just, [which he believes it is], however discriminatorily applied to only
some of the guilty, it remains just in each case in which it is applied .... Unequal justice also is
morally repellant. Nonetheless unequal justice is still justice."). What appears to distinguish the
Florida sheriff from Van den Haag is that the sheriff sees no immorality in the unequal treatment
while Van den Haag, although willing to tolerate it to ensure that justice is done in individual
cases, sees a significant injustice when a white defendant receives a life sentence while a similarly
situated black offender is sentenced to death. McAdams, supra note 65, at 168 ("Between an
inequitable death penalty and no death penalty, I would prefer an inequitable death penalty ....
I say this because I think it likely that executions deter murders, and it is clear that a majority of
Americans-white and black-think that justice requires executions for the most heinous
crimes.").
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From this perspective, the only problem with race-of-defendant dis-
crimination is that it enables white defendants to avoid their just
deserts, thereby undermining a principal justification for capital pun-
ishment.75 These sentiments stand in sharp contrast to public atti-
tudes about racial profiling practices, which put innocent black
motorists and pedestrians at risk of police stops and arrest strictly on
the basis of their race. National polls show that 60% of adults believe
racial profiling is widespread 76 and that over 80% believe the practice
is wrong.77
The indifference of the general public about race and the death
penalty is reinforced by the apparent indifference of elected public
officials and the courts to the issue. To our knowledge, only one high-
visibility public official, former Maryland Governor Parris Glenden-
ing, has expressed public concern about the issue when he declared a
moratorium on executions until the issue could be studied. 78 The
principal source of publicly stated concerns about the issue has been
various black legislative caucuses, black leaders, and abolitionists
whose claims and expressions of concern appear to carry little
weight.79
75. This position is stated with force by Van den Haag. See Van den Haag, supra note 74, at
323-24.
76. Gallup Poll, Sept. 24, 1999-Nov. 16, 1999, Public Opinion Online, The Roper Center at the
University of Connecticut, available at LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll file (59% of adults eighteen
and over believed that racial profiling is widespread).
77. Levels of distaste for discrimination, as well as support for remedial measures, increases
when the perceived victims of the discrimination are noncriminals. An overwhelming percent-
age of the public thinks that racial profiling is bad. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston,
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 & n.1 (2002) (noting that over
80% of Americans disapproved of racial profiling in 1999, and most still disapprove even after
the September 11, 2001 attacks).
78. Editorial, Finally, a Moratorium, BALT. SUN, May 10, 2002, at 22A. As soon as successor,
Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., was installed, he announced his intent to lift the moratorium.
Susan Levine, Md. Gears Up for Execution, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at Al. The United States
Congress, when confronted with evidence suggesting a risk of race discrimination in the adminis-
tration of the federal death penalty, declined to impose a moratorium, but did direct funding to
the National Institute of Justice to conduct a study of the federal system. See infra note 124 and
accompanying text.
79. For example, protests of the Florida legislative black caucus about the influence of race in
Florida's system prompted Governor Jeb Bush to convene a task force to study the issue. Linda
Kleindienst & John Kennedy, On Death Row, Inmates' Choice, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Jan. 7, 2000, at 1A ("[A]ware of the political implication of appearing insensitive to black
concerns, Bush hastily signed an executive order . . . creating a task force to study the issue
.... ) The claims were diminished and no meaningful action was recommended. An exception
to this pattern occurred in Kentucky where concerns about race resulted in a legislatively funded
study, whose results were the basis for a legislative adoption of the country's only Racial Justice
Act. Edward C. Monahan, Racial Justice Act Becomes Law: Not Soft on Crime, but Strong on
Justice, THE ADVOCATE, July 1998, at 5-7.
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Indifference and tolerance for race discrimination has been further
enhanced by the response of the judiciary to claims of discrimination.
Most important in that regard is the 5-4 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp. It held that statistically
based evidence of a pattern and practice of race-based disparate treat-
ment in the administration of the death penalty would not establish a
cognizable claim under either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To obtain relief
under the Constitution, a claimant must establish purposeful race dis-
crimination on the part of the prosecutor or the jury in the case, inde-
pendent of any evidence of a pattern and practice of discrimination in
the system. Because this burden of proof is impossible to meet, Mc-
Cleskey effectively removed the issue from the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. Justice Lewis Powell's opinion also intimated that an
important reason for the Court's refusal to recognize the cognizability
of claims of systemic race discrimination was the difficulty of prevent-
ing or correcting such discrimination, short of a substantial impair-
ment or complete abolition of capital punishment. That said, Justice
Powell suggested that the more appropriate forum for the considera-
tion of race and the death penalty is the legislative branch.
McCleskey takes on added significance in historical context. In the
pre-Furman period, race-of-defendant discrimination was perceived to
be an important problem in the use of the death penalty.80 In the
1960s, these concerns gathered support against the background of the
civil rights movement and declining support for capital punishment in
general.81 Such concerns were also supported by data on death sen-
tencing and executions, especially in southern jurisdictions, that sup-
ported the generally held belief that race-of-defendant discrimination
in the use of the death penalty was widespread.82 Indeed, pre-Furman
expressions of concern about race discrimination were far more prom-
inent than concerns about the arbitrariness in death sentencing that
the Court condemned in Furman v. Georgia.8 3
80. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncon-
stitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1792-93 (1970) ("Most commentators describe the imposition
of the death penalty as not only haphazard and capricious but also discriminatory... it is very
unlikely that the essentially arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of capital punishment can be
halted.").
81. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 240 (2002) (In 1966,
"opponents outnumbered supporters: 47 to 42 percent"; support was weaker in the South and
Midwest than it was in the East and West.).
82. See supra note 7.
83. BANNER, supra note 81, at 247-50; Kennedy, supra note, 47, at 324.
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The political and legal context of McClesky was quite different. By
1987, the issue of race-of-defendant effects was perceived to be much
less serious than it had been in 1972,84 public support for capital pun-
ishment had nearly doubled since Furman (a fact well known to the
Court), 85 and the Court's membership was slightly more conservative
on criminal law issues.86 Moreover, not only had the energy of the
civil rights movement abated, but the nation also had experienced a
widespread feeling that the civil rights movement may have gone too
far in providing "quotas" and other forms of favorable treatment for
black citizens.87 It appears that in the Court's view, it was now best
left to Congress and the states if there was a problem in need of
attention.
In retrospect, it is clear that McCleskey has significantly legitimated
tolerance for race discrimination. This effect, which was anticipated
by Randall Kennedy within a year of the decision, has several dimen-
sions. First, as Professor Kennedy points out, McCleskey obscures the
subtle manner in which race influences death penalty decision making
in the post-Furman period.88 The core holding condemns as unconsti-
tutional only blatant violations of equal protection driven by a desire
to harm individuals or groups because of their race. The forms of dis-
crimination we see today, in contrast, are "untainted by conscious in-
tent to harm blacks."'89 Rather, the roots of today's race-of-defendant
discrimination are largely unconscious, and the roots of race-of-victim
discrimination are not race-based hostility, but race-based empathy.
McCleskey completely ignores this reality and views with concern only
gross forms of discrimination that characterized pre-Furman systems,
particularly in the South. The impact of McCleskey's perception of
84. The empirical record had made that fact quite clear by 1987, including the Georgia race-
of-defendant discrimination findings presented to the court in McCleskey. Justice Powell stated
to his biographer that, with respect to race-of-defendant discrimination, the McCleskey record
"suggests no such effect." JEFF'RIES, infra note 110, at 439.
85. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court noted the surge of support for the
death penalty it saw in the post-Furman state legislation. See JESSIE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 160 (1980) ("By both words and action, the Court
itself has long recognized that heightened judicial activism contrary to popular sentiment may
weaken its authority to continue."). Justice Goldberg's 1962 suggestion to his colleagues that the
death penalty was unconstitutional infuriated many Court members out of fear that the mere
suggestion of such an idea "would turn public opinion against the [c]ourt and thus indirectly
encourage defiance of controversial decisions in other areas, especially desegregation." BAN-
NER, supra note 81, at 250.
86. Recall that both Furman and McCleskey were 5-4 decisions, with Justice Douglas replaced
by Justice Stevens, Justice Burger by Justice Scalia, and Justice Stewart by Justice O'Connor.
87. See supra note 81.
88. See supra note 25.
89. Id.
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the "problem" is reflected in a recent Pennsylvania editorial that drew
explicitly on McCleskey: "But even if further study indicates that, in
general, blacks convicted of murder are more likely to receive the
death penalty than whites, it doesn't prove that any particular death
sentence is tainted by racism." 90
As noted above, McCleskey entirely removed the issue of race from
the federal courts.91 Its holding has also justified and legitimated the
failure of state courts to consider the issue.92 Indeed a number of
state courts have cited McCleskey as the basis for their refusal to hear
claims under state law.93
The refusal of the courts to consider race claims in a meaningful
way also reinforces the impression that race discrimination is not a
serious problem; if it were, the argument goes, judicial action would
have been taken to remedy it. This logic was recently stated by a
spokesperson for Pennsylvania's Attorney General in an effort to re-
fute the significance of evidence of race discrimination in Philadel-
phia's capital punishment system: "The Supreme Court already has
not only the power, but the duty to overturn a death sentence if it
finds evidence that race played a role in the sentence. That hasn't
90. Editorial, Executing a Prejudice/Disparities Don't Necessarily Mean Discrimination, PrTrs-
BURG POST-GAZE-rrE, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/forum/200301led-
death0311pl.asp (last visited May 10, 2004).
91. John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1807 (1998). ("It is remarkable that in ten years of post-McCleskey
litigation, not a single claimant has prevailed. In any discrimination case, judges are reluctant to
find intentional discrimination by state officials."). In contrast to the statewide approach in Mc-
Cleskey, the more recent claims allege "county level selective prosecution." Id. at 1806. The
personal experience and research of Blume et al., id. at 1773, document that some state and
federal courts misconstrue McCleskey as barring all claifits of racial discrimination in the admin-
istration of the death penalty not just those based solely on statistical evidence. They also im-
pose unrealistic methodological requirements (e.g., faulting the sample size of cases and the
number of control variables compared to the McCleskey evidence). Id. at 1799-1802. In his opin-
ion, a major basis for the judicial reluctance to "discuss or even describe evidence of racial bias
in criminal cases" is a "[flear of labeling state officials racist." Id. at 1809.
92. New Jersey is the principal exception. See infra note 119.
93. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1993) ("Foster ... claims a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. Art I, § 2, Fla. Const. Despite the princi-
ples adopted in Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992), establishing the primacy of the Florida
Constitution, the majority completely ignores Foster's state constitutional challenge.") (Barkett,
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 1997) (re-
jecting a claim brought under art. 1, § § 3, 14, and 15 of the South Carolina Constitution). See
also supra note 91, at 1781-98 (discussing state court challenges rejected upon the authority of
McCleskey.).
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been happening in Pennsylvania. '94 Since no judicial action has been
taken, one can only assume there is no problem.
McCleskey has also undermined efforts to implement Justice Pow-
ell's suggestion that "McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the
legislative bodies"95 by stiffening the resistance of Congress and state
legislatures to meaningful consideration of the issue. Specifically, Mc-
Cleskey has strengthened three arguments against corrective legisla-
tion, such as the Racial Justice Act. The first argument is that
statistical proof is irrelevant to the issue of racial justice,96 the second
is that race discrimination is inevitable and irremediable, and the third
is that the only possible remedy would eliminate capital punishment in
Georgia. 97 This trio of arguments underscores the claim that toler-
ance of race discrimination is "necessary" to preserve the death pen-
alty and that the recognition of race claims would "erase" the death
penalty as we know it.98 With the exception of Kentucky, no remedial
legislation has been adopted, further enhancing the perception that
race is not a problem. 99
C. The Attentive Public
Close observers of the death penalty in practice are keenly aware
of the difference between race-of-defendant and race-of-victim dis-
crimination.
94. Quoted in a 2003 Associated Press story on the final report of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System, available at http://ve-
nus.soci.niu.edu/-archives /ABOLISH/aprO3/0131.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
95. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
96. See, e.g., Richard Seven, Racism Charged in Death-Penalty Filing-Victim's Color Is Key,
Says Defense, SEATrLE TIMES, June 20, 1994, at B1 (Characterizing the defendant's statistics as
"meaningless and misleading," Prosecutor Craig Peterson stated that "[tlhe U.S. Supreme Court
has rejected statistical analysis because no death-penalty case is the same .... They all have
different facts, different victims, different defendants. You can't compare them like they have.")
97. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312, 314-15 (1987) (Powell, J.); id at 365-66 (Stevens, J., and Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (disputing the claim).
98. The congressional floor debates, which bristled with these claims, are heavily grounded in
the language and tone of Justice Powell's opinion. David C. Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 380-
83. The irremediability argument draws on Justice Powell's skeptical critique of the remedies
proposed by Justice Stevens and supported by Justice Blackmun in their dissenting opinions.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318-19 n.45.
99. The adoption of Kentucky's Racial Justice Act in 1998 was widely seen as recognition that
race was a problem in the administration of capital punishment in the state. Neal, supra note 24,
at 17 (One public defender stated, "The RJA is recognition that we in Kentucky have engaged in
racial discrimination when it comes to the death penalty and that we pledge not to do it any-
more."). Race claims have also been authorized by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See supra
note 40. In infra subpart IV(B)(2), we examine the extent to which the authorization of race
claims has erased or materially impaired the use of the death penalty.
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1. Race-of-Defendant Discrimination
All jurists who have publicly addressed the issue have condemned
purposeful race-of-defendant discrimination in the administration of
justice in general, and in the use of the death penalty in particular.
Legislatures have also condemned such discrimination.'00
No scholars to our knowledge have sought to justify race-of-defen-
dant discrimination in the administration of the death penalty.101
Most supporters of capital punishment follow the courts in condemn-
ing race-of-defendant discrimination while insisting that it has not
been shown to be a problem in the system or that all proposed reme-
dies would unreasonably impinge on the enforcement of the death
penalty. 102
With no leadership or pressure from the Supreme Court, Congress
and state legislators have had little incentive to address the issue.10 3
However, concern about the risk of race-of-defendant discrimination
has produced some reaction. For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, when presented with evidence that race may be a factor in its
penalty trial decisions, announced a willingness under the New Jersey
Constitution to go beyond McCleskey and deal with the issue under
the New Jersey Constitution if such discrimination was proven. 10 4
Nevertheless, the evidence presented to the New Jersey Supreme
Court has never been sufficiently compelling to convince it that a seri-
ous problem existed.10 5 In 1998, the Kentucky Legislature, with lead-
ership from its black caucus, adopted a limited Racial Justice Act in
response to a legislatively funded study that documented a signifi-
100. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2000) (instructing federal juries not to return a death sen-
tence unless they conclude they would impose a death sentence "no matter" what race the de-
fendant and victim may be). New York's criminal procedure statutes also explicitly provide for
race-conscious proportionality review. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 470.30(3)(b) (McKINNEY 1995)
(stating that the Court of Appeals should determine "whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue of the race of the defendant
or a victim of the crime"); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACrs § 211-a (McKINNEY 1995) (tasking the Court of
Appeals with responsibility for creating a database of death eligible homicides "with the purpose
of assisting the court.., in determining.., whether a particular sentence of death is dispropor-
tionate or excessive .... ").
101. Van den Haag, supra note 74, deems race discrimination unjust but not sufficiently so to
justify the abolition of capital punishment.
102. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 70, at 124 ("Racism is a cancer" and although "tragi-
cally inevitable" in the "capital punishment arena," we "must do everything we can to reduce
that impact.").
103. Congress, for example, which first considered the Racial Justice Act in 1989, rejected it
finally in 1994. Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 426-30 (presenting the history of Congress's
consideration of the Racial Justice Act).
104. See infra note 119.
105. See supra note 40.
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cantly higher risk of a death sentence for black defendants with white
victims than all other defendants. 10 6
In 2001, concerns about race-of-defendant discrimination appear to
have motivated Attorney General Ashcroft to limit U.S. Attorneys'
plea bargaining discretion after he personally authorized a capital
prosecution.10 7 Similar concerns in 2003 appear also to have moti-
vated a blue ribbon panel of lawyers and citizens in Pennsylvania to
recommend a moratorium on executions in that state, the adoption of
a racial justice act, and the appointment by the supreme court of a
special master to create a database of death-eligible cases and to eval-
uate the data for evidence of race-based disparate treatment. 0 8
2. Race-of-Victim Discrimination
As we noted in Part II above, the evidence of race-of-victim dis-
crimination is considerably more pervasive than the evidence of race-
of-defendant discrimination. It is, however, perceived by some ob-
servers to present much less of a moral issue than race-of-defendant
discrimination. 10 9 Evidence of this perception is Justice Powell's sug-
gestion, post-retirement from the Supreme Court, that he would have
viewed McCleskey's case quite differently if his evidence had docu-
mented a comparable pattern of race-of-victim rather than race-of-
defendant discrimination.110 In this section, we explore the basis for
106. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(4) (MICHIE 1998) (Kentucky Racial Justice Act). The
statute authorized pretrial challenges to prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences on the
basis of the race of the defendant or victim. For background of the enactment, see Monahan,
supra note 79.
107. Under the new rule, after a capital prosecution has been authorized by the Attorney
General, plea bargains involving a waiver of the death penalty must be approved by the Attor-
ney General. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
108. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 219-21(2003), available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/
Supreme/BiasReports.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) (Chapter 6 is devoted to capital
punishment.).
109. The formal law, stated in McCleskey v. Kemp, draws no legal distinction between the two
forms of discrimination. 481 U.S. 279, 292 & n.8 (1987).
110. JoN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 439 (1994) ("[Justice Powell] also
did not know what constitutional weight to give to the statistical effect of the victim's race ....
'[O]ne would expect that if there were race-based sentencing, the Baldus study would show a
bias based on the defendant's race,' but the 'study suggests no such effect . . . ' Differential
treatment of defendants based on the race of their victims was hard to understand as racial bias
against defendants.") (quoting Justice Powell's remarks in an interview with Professor Jeffries).
Justice Powell's biographer later stated: "For what it's worth, I do think he [Justice Powell] would
have viewed the case differently had the data shown large race-of-defendant disparities." E-mail
from John Jeffries to David Baldus (Jan. 8, 2004) (on file with authors). Similar views concern-
ing the significance of race-of-victim discrimination were expressed by a Florida circuit (trial)
court judge at a recent task force meeting on race and the death penalty. See supra note 74. She
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this distinction and argue that race-of-victim discrimination is not only
unconstitutional but also sufficiently immoral to justify government
action to prevent it and remediate its effects when they are
documented.
Since Brown v. Board of Education,"' the unconstitutionality of
race-of-defendant discrimination has never been in doubt despite the
absence of a judicial decision affording a black defendant relief on
such a claim." 2 Claims of race-of-victim discrimination have a weaker
legal pedigree. In fact, the claim was unknown to the law before the
late 1970s. 113 Moreover, until McCleskey, there remained an issue of
whether such a claim was legally cognizable. 1" 4 McCleskey, however,
held that it was on the ground that the imposition of a death sentence
on the basis of the victim's race would: (a) violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;"1 5 and (b) be "excessive"
under the Eighth Amendment "because racial consideration may in-
fluence capital sentencing decisions in Georgia" and, therefore, race
may have been a factor in the defendant's case." 6 Nevertheless, in his
litany of the Supreme Court's efforts to "eradicate racial prejudice
from our criminal justice system," Justice Powell focused exclusively
on examples of discrimination that adversely affected criminal defend-
ants because of their race." 7
A handful of state supreme courts have expressed a willingness to
address the race discrimination issue"18 but the New Jersey Supreme
stated flatly that (McCleskey v. Kemp to the contrary notwithstanding,) she saw no problem
whatsoever with race-of-victim discrimination. Id.
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 1965) (For a claim of race-of-defendant
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty in rape cases, we "recognize ... that a
statute's discriminatory administration or enforcement, dictated solely by considerations of race,
runs afoul of the equal protection clause.").
113. See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 612-15 (5th Cir. 1978) (Race-of-victim dis-
crimination raises both Eighth Amendment arbitrariness and Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claims that were considered but denied for insufficiency of proof.); Smith v. Balkcom,
671 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1982) (Equal Protection claim considered but denial of a hearing was
appropriate because of insufficiency of proof.).
114. In McCleskey, the State argued that McCleskey lacked standing to raise claims of "third
persons" such as the "black murder victims in general." 481 U.S. at 291-92 n.8. The Court
rejected this argument and recognized McCleskey's standing on the basis of his claim that race-
of-victim discrimination would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for a "State to base enforcement of its criminal law on and "unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id.
115. Id. at 292.
116. Id. at 308.
117. Id. at 308 & n.30.
11. Other states have similarly followed suit to aggressively oppose any hint of racism in
criminal trials. See White v. State, 726 A.2d 858, 869 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) ("Nothing
can be more central to a criminal trial than the right of a defendant to be judged fairly, without
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Court is the only one to have adjudicated such a claim.119
Most legal commentators have condemned race-of-victim discrimi-
nation in the same terms as race-of-defendant discrimination-as a
race-based distortion of the system that offends not only the Constitu-
tion but also basic principles of comparative justice. 120 However,
racial prejudice, and all involved in the trial of a criminal case should conscientiously work to
avoid such appeals."); State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 961-62 (Conn. 1995) (holding that claims of
race discrimination may be raised on direct appeal and in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has shown not only a willingness to hear such claims but also a
willingness to step outside the strict constraints of McCleskey:
The McCleskey Court reasoned that although the statistical data showed a discrepancy
that may correlate with race, "disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system." The Court held that McCleskey's equal-protection claim must
fail because there was no showing of purposeful discriminatory intent. It shrank from
recognizing McCleskey's claim because "taken to its logical conclusion, [it] throws into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system." The
Court feared that if it accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias impermissibly tainted
the capital-sentencing decision, it "could soon be faced with similar claims as to other
types of penalty." Carrying the parade of horribles to its extreme, the Court posited
that it would have to study any set of arbitrary variables such as the defendant's physi-
cal characteristics or those of the victim that "some statistical study indicates may be
influential in jury decisionmaking." This Court cannot refuse to confront those terrible
realities. We have committed ourselves to determining whether racial and ethnic bias
exist in our judicial system and to "recommend ways of eliminating it wherever it is
found." Hence, were we to believe that the race of the victim and race of the defendant
played a significant part in capital-sentencing decisions in New Jersey, we would seek
corrective measures, and if that failed we could not, consistent with our State's policy,
tolerate discrimination that threatened the foundation of our system of law.
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1110 (N.J. 1992) (citations omitted).
119. The court has denied relief on claims of both race-of-defendant discrimination, Marshall,
613 A.2d at 1102, and race-of-victim discrimination, State v. Morton, 757 A.2d 184, 268 (N.J.
2000). See also infra note 250.
120. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1389 (Speaking from a retentionist perspective with
respect to legitimacy capital punishment in principle, Professor Kennedy states that the McCles-
key "ruling and the way it was articulated are grievously flawed. Professor [Hugo] Bedau does
not exaggerate when he compares McCleskey to Plessy and Korematsu .... [It] repressed the
truth and validated racially oppressive official conduct"); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the
Death Penalty, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 86 (1988) (speaking from an abolitionist perspective with
respect to the legitimacy of capital punishment in principle, the author states that "there can be
no justice in a system which treats people of color differently from white people, or treats crimes
against people of color differently than crimes against white people .... [A contention that the]
power to discriminate on grounds of race is necessary to protect society from crime ... refers to
protecting only white people"); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW 117 (1999) (The data documented a "substantial risk that punishment will
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner" and the McCleskey Court rendered "statisti-
cal proof irrelevant."); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE
LAW 186 (1995) (The documented race disparities "were due to race and unconstitutional" and
the Court demanded proof "that could not be provided" unless a prosecutor or juror publicly
admitted "[w]e got the black man."); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. Black Man's Burden: Race and the
Death Penalty in America 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (2002) ("In light of the continued racial imbal-
ance in the application of the death penalty, the burden that the Supreme Court's decision in
McCleskey places on blacks continues to operate at a number of levels.").
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there are others willing to tolerate such discrimination as a price
worth paying to retain the benefits of capital punishment. 121 The will-
ingness of the McCleskey majority to tolerate such systems is consis-
tent with that position. However, not all Members of the McCleskey
Court shared that view.122
Further, there is evidence in some jurisdictions that concern about
race-of-victim discrimination has motivated public policy. In Mary-
land, such a concern produced a short-lived gubernatorial moratorium
on executions. 23 Similar concerns partially motivated Congress to
support a study of the federal death penalty system by the National
Institute of Justice.1 24 Government bodies have also commissioned or
required research on the issue in Arizona,12 5 Maryland, 2 6 New
York, 127 New Jersey, 128 Illinois, 129 Indiana, 130 Nebraska, 131 and Vir-
121. See McAdams, supra note 65, at 168; Van den Haag, supra note 74, at 323-24.
122. There were four dissenting votes in McCleskey who found the problem sufficiently seri-
ous to justify a legal remedy. In Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1148 (1994), Justice Blackmun
dwelt at length on the race issue.
123. See supra note 78. In states with strong evidence of race-of-victim discrimination, such as
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Maryland, we estimate that one quarter to one third of death-
sentenced defendants with white victims would have avoided the death penalty if their victims
had been black. We base these estimates on an application of the death-sentencing rates for
black-victim cases to white-victim cases with comparable levels of culpability on a culpability
scale and contrast the disparity in the number of death sentences imposed at each level on the
scale. For example, if, at a given level on the scale, the adjusted death-sentencing rate is .20 (5/
20) for the white-victim cases and .05 (5/100) for the black-victim cases, there would have been
one rather than five death sentences imposed in the white-victim cases had the .05 black-victim
rate been applied to the white-victim cases at the same level of culpability. We sum the expected
shortfall at each level on the scale to estimate the total number of death sentences we would
likely have seen if the standard applied to the black-victim cases had been applied to the white-
victim cases.
124. NAT'L INST. OF JUST, RESEARCH INTO THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF HOMI-
CIDE: EXAMINING THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM (2001), available at http://
www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/sO00490.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
125. PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, ARIZONA CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION, ARIZONA FIRST-
DEGREE MURDER CASES SUMMARY OF 1995-1999 INDICTMENTS: DATA SET II RESEARCH RE-
PORT TO ARIZONA CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION (2002).
126. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14.
127. New York's death penalty statute requires the Court of Appeals to collect data for use in
its reviews of cases for race effects. See supra note 100.
128. DAVID BAIME, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: SYSTEMIC PROPORTION-
ALITY REVIEW PROJECT (2001); DAVID WEIS13URD & JOSEPH NAUS, REPORT TO SPECIAL
MASTER BAIME: RE SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW (2001).
129. Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, Race, Region, and Death-Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-
1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002).
130. MARY ZIEMBA-DAVIS & BRENT L. MYERS, IND.CRIMINAL JUST. INST., THE APPLICA-
TION OF INDIANA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR FRANK O'BANNON
AND THE INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2002), available at www.in.gov/cji/lawstudy/
law.book.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
131. David Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 486.
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ginia. 132 However, in no jurisdiction has a court granted relief on a
claim of race-of-victim discrimination. 133
We also consider two arguments advanced to diminish the signifi-
cance of race-of-victim discrimination. The first is that there is insuffi-
cient evidence of purposeful (conscious or unconscious) race-of-victim
discrimination to be a matter of concern (the factual claim). Second,
even if purposeful discrimination does exist, it is sufficiently distin-
guishable from race-of-defendant discrimination on moral grounds to
be tolerable (the moral claim).
At the outset, it is useful to focus on what race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim discrimination have in common. What they share is de-
cision making based on irrelevant case characteristics-the race of the
defendant or victim-which constitute "a failure of the institutional
structure to conform to the principles that justify that structure. '134
This common feature is the basis for the Supreme Court's holding that
both forms of discrimination violate the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments. 135
a. The Factual Claim-Challenges to the Sufficiency of the
Evidence of Purposeful Race-of-Victim Discrimination
The claim that the race-of-victim disparities documented in the
literature are not a product of invidious discrimination rests on a num-
ber of assertions.136 One source of skepticism on the issue is uncer-
tainty about the mechanism that would produce the race-of-victim
discrimination documented in the literature. Most people can under-
stand why black defendants may be treated more punitively than
white defendants; however, most people have never thought about a
process that would incline prosecutors or juries to discriminate con-
132. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM. OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW
OF VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://jlarc.state.va.uslre-
ports/rpt274.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
133. Blume et al., supra note 91, at 1807.
134. Schopp, supra note 2, at 826 (Both forms of discrimination represent "a failure of the
institutional function of disciplining the manner in which the state exercises coercive force
against its citizens.").
135. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987) (A "statutory classification cannot be
'wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."') (quoting McGowan v. Mary-
land 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
136. As used here, the concept "invidious" does not refer to a conscious intent to harm an
individual offender or a class of offenders because of their race; rather, it refers to differential
treatment of offenders whose victims are white that cannot be explained by legitimate case char-
acteristics, such as offender culpability, and variations in charging practices among different
counties. As Professor Kennedy notes and we explain below, race-of-victim discrimination is
largely a product of racially selective "empathy" rather than "hostility." Kennedy, supra note
25, at 1420.
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sciously or unconsciously on the basis of the victim's race in a capital
prosecution.
Skepticism may also be enhanced by the claim that race-of-victim
discrimination or, for that matter, race-of-defendant discrimination in
a capital punishment system cannot be detected through statistical
analyses even if they factor in the system. This is a popular argument
of opponents of the Racial Justice Act. 137 However, whatever the lim-
itations of statistical analysis may be, there is simply no other alterna-
tive to identifying systemic discrimination in the death penalty system.
The Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, formerly Attor-
ney General of the state, acknowledged that fact:
The study of system-wide discrimination requires the use of statisti-
cal techniques in complex political settings. The process is far more
complicated than counting the number of defendants by race and
the number of death penalties meted out, although it certainly in-
cludes such elementary comparative analyses . . . we know of no
other means by which the relationship, if any, between race and the
death penalty system in New Jersey may be reviewed. The impor-
tance of understanding whether racial discrimination infects our sys-
tem of capital punishment requires that we make this effort.
138
Another source of skepticism is a perception that race-of-victim dis-
parities are a naturally occurring outcome of an evenhanded race-neu-
tral decision-making process. A number of nonracial rival hypotheses
have been advanced to explain away the clearly documented race-of-
victim effects. Our review of the literature and the media has identi-
fied seven such explanations. Virtually all of these hypotheses build
on perceived stereotypical differences between white and black vic-
tims that are widely accepted as ordinary knowledge in the white com-
munity. Following is the list of perceived race-neutral explanations:
1. Black victims are more likely to have lower "moral character"
than white victims. For example, black drug dealer victims are less
appealing to juries than white shop owner victims. 139
137. Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 381 (U.S. Senator Orin Hatch stated: "[S]tatistics have no
place in the criminal justice equation. Murderers must be judged and sentenced without regard
to statistics.").
138. In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 171-72 (N.J. 2000). In the New
Jersey court's review of individual cases for comparative excessiveness, it places only minimal
reliance on the results of statistical analyses because, in contrast to the analysis of systemic race
effects, they are not necessary to conduct such reviews. See, e.g., State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d
798 (N.J. 2002).
139. TUROW, supra note 46, at 72-73. Turow stated:
No one would be surprised to see otherwise identical murders result in the death pen-
alty when the victim was a beloved schoolteacher who was the mother of three young
children, and a lesser sentence if the person killed was a crack-addicted drug dealer. On
the face of it, race plays no part in these judgments, but because wealth, power, and
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2. White-victim cases are more culpable because they are more
likely to involve felony murders and other contemporaneous
offenses. 140
3. In the eyes of white jurors, white victims and their families are
perceived to be more sympathetic figures than black victims and their
families because of their race and higher socioeconomic status.141
Well designed empirical studies have tested the plausibility of these
rival hypotheses by estimating race-of-victim effects after controlling
for the presence of contemporaneous crimes and the socioeconomic
status of the victims. 142 It is clear that the combination of these fac-
tors reduces somewhat the magnitude of the race-of-victim effects, but
they clearly fail to explain away those effects.1 43 However, this spe-
status in the United States are still so unevenly distributed along racial lines, there
would inevitably be a race effect, even if we were all color-blind. Furthermore, it is also
fair to note that in a city like Chicago about half of the murders are gang-related. Race
is obviously part of the picture when we talk about gangs, but it is also significant in
deciding whether capital punishment is appropriate in a given case that the victim, in
messing with gangs, voluntarily placed himself in harm's way.
Id.
140. See, e.g., Bob Levenson & Debbie Salamone, Prosecutors See Death Penalty in Black and
White, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 1992, at Al (reporting findings of an empirical study of 283
prosecutorial charging decisions in six central Florida counties (1986-91) conducted by the news-
paper with a 13-percentage point white-victim effect (27% to 14%) that prosecutors explained
on the ground that white-victim cases "are more often the victims of carefully planned killings
that may include other crimes, such as rape or robbery: blacks are more often the victims of less
heinous, unplanned killings during domestic quarrels and bar fights."); DISSENTING VIEws ON
RACIAL JUSTICE ACT, House Comm. On the Judiciary, 103d Cong. H.R. Rep. 103-458, at 14
(1994) ("While it may be true that killers of white victims are more likely to receive the death
penalty than killers of blacks, this statistical disparity is easily explained by the presence of miti-
gating or aggravating factors, which account for the differences in sentences."). Kennedy, supra
note 47, at 348, cites and takes issue with this claim.
141. This is the "racially based empathy" theory stated by Professor Kennedy, supra note 47,
and elaborated on by Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro. See GRoss & MAURO, supra note 22,
at 113-15. Gross and Mauro wrote:
In a society that remains segregated socially, if not legally, and in which the great ma-
jority of jurors are white, jurors are not likely to identify with black victims or to see
them as family or friends. Thus jurors are more likely to be horrified by the killing of a
white than of a black, and more likely to act against the killer of a white than the killer
of a black. This reaction is not an expression of racial hostility but a natural product of
the patterns of interracial relations in our society. It is simply an emotional fact ....
[Prosecutors in deciding what cases to prosecute capitally are] "influenced by their pre-
dictions of the jury's likely reaction" [to the case and in the words of Justice White in
Gregg v. Georgia, "the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it
convicts."
Id. at 114.
142. See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 319-20, 667 (controls for contemporaneous
offenses); id. at 588-89, 596-97 (controls for low-status victim) (Georgia); PATERNOSTER &
BRAME, supra note 14, at 81 tbl. liE (controls for contemporaneous crimes) (Maryland).
143. See PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14.
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cialized evidence appears to have had little impact on the widely ac-
cepted ordinary knowledge that underlies these beliefs.1 44
4. White-victim effects are the product of legitimate differences in
prosecutorial charging practices between center cities (where one sees
significant numbers of black-victim cases and very lenient charging
practices), and the suburbs (with significant numbers of white-victim
cases and much more punitive charging practices). 145
5. White-victim cases attract greater attention in the media than
black-victim cases, which produces pressure on prosecutors to adopt a
more punitive approach to white-victim cases.
6. Law enforcement is more difficult in black than in white commu-
nities because witnesses in black communities are more reluctant to
cooperate 146 with the authorities because of suspicions about the po-
lice or fear that witnesses who cooperate may be harmed. 147 This, the
theory continues, results in weaker evidence in the black-victim cases,
which generally occur in black communities, thereby making a capital
prosecution less likely.
7. Support for capital punishment is substantially lower in black
communities than it is in white communities. 148 Thus, to the extent
144. TUROW, supra note 46.
145. See, e.g., Susan Levine & Lori Montgomery, Large Racial Disparity Found [in] Study of
Md. Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al. Maryland prosecutor, Ann Brobst ex-
pressed skepticism about the meaning of race-of-victim disparities in PATERNOSTER & BRAME,
supra note 14, because of differences in policy and practice between jurisdictions: "If you have
one jurisdiction which seeks the death penalty in every eligible case and two massively larger
jurisdictions that never do, ever, yet have the vast majority of African American victims-well,
you see the problem." Id. However, the Paternoster and Brame study estimated statistically
significant statewide race-of-victim effects after controlling for place of prosecution (a 3.3 white-
victim odds multiplier). PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14, at 87 tbl. 12E. Moreover,
separate analyses within Baltimore County (predominantly white) and Baltimore City (predomi-
nantly black) show race-of-victim effects in both places (for death sentencing rates among all
death-eligible cases, the white victim disparity in Baltimore City is 0.06 versus 0.005 and 0.25
versus 0.13 in Baltimore County) (analyses on file with authors). Research from Georgia in the
1970s shows strong race-of-victim effects in both rural and urban areas generally and in Atlanta,
in particular. DAVID BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 178-81, 332-40. Data on prosecutorial
charging decisions in New Jersey is to the same effect, but the statewide disparity is not consid-
ered sufficiently strong to justify relief. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
146. In explaining a white-victim disparity in a central Florida study, prosecutors "said that
black witnesses often are more reluctant to cooperate with authorities." Levenson & Salamone,
supra note 140.
147. One concern is the perception that convictions are less frequent and sentences are lighter
in black-victim cases, which may put the killer back onto the street with an opportunity to retali-
ate or confederates of the offender may retaliate on their own motion or at the instigation of the
offender.
148. Total public support for the death penalty has waned slightly in recent years. Overall,
77% of whites and 47% of blacks are in favor of the death penalty. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 54, at 144. Each demographic has changed in its support for the death penalty over the last
few years, from a recent high of 78% of whites and 58% of blacks supporting the death penalty
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that prosecutors take into account the views of the victim's family, the
request for a capital prosecution is likely to be higher when the victim
is white.
Moreover, because most prosecutors are white, the families of white
victims are more likely to meet with the prosecutor and press their
views on the death penalty.149 For the reasons stated above, as well as
a long history in this country of discounting the importance of black-
defendant/black-victim crimes, we consider it highly plausible that the
statistically significant race-of-victim effects documented in the litera-
ture reflect a devaluing (conscious or unconscious) of black murder
victims. Our view on this matter is shared by two methodologically
sophisticated supporters of capital punishment, 150 including former
prosecutor Scott Turow. 151
b. Moral Distinctions Between Race-of-Victim and Race-of-
Defendant Discrimination
In terms of morality, race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimi-
nation are distinguished on a number of levels. One ground for the
distinction is differences between the victims and beneficiaries of the
two forms of discrimination. The victims of race-of-defendant dis-
crimination are easy to identify-black defendants. The adverse ef-
fects of race-of-victim discrimination are more subtle. Within the
black community, there are two levels of victimization. First are the
black victims (and their families), whose losses are undervalued be-
cause they are treated less seriously than the losses of white victims
and their families. 152 Second, race-of-victim discrimination results in
unfair treatment of the black community because it undermines for it,
the goals of retribution and deterrence that justify the use of capital
in 1990, to recent lows of 69% and 42%, respectively, supporting the death penalty in 2000. Id.
at 143.
149. This may be a product of prosecutorial policy or reflect choices of victims' families.
150. See McAdams, supra note 65, at 166 ("There is a general and quite robust bias against
[imposing the death penalty in cases involving] black victims .... [T]he notion that prosecutors
and judges are less willing to expend the scarce resources of the criminal justice system to con-
vict and execute the murderers of blacks is all too plausible. In fact, it is clearly the case.");
WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 120 (1987) (With re-
spect to the impact of race in sentencing generally: "Race of victim may be a better predictor of
sentence than race of defendant. This is certainly true for the death penalty cases .. "). Similar
considerations convinced Professor Randall Kennedy that the race-of-victim effects documented
in the literature reflect real effects in the cases. See KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 1396 n.27;
Kenedy supra note 47, at 348.
151. Turow sees race-of-victim disparities as an inevitable consequence of differentials in the
"wealth, power, and status" of white and black victims. See TUROW, supra note 46, at 72-73.
152. Schopp, supra note 2, at 824, 830.
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punishment. 153 Both of these harms are significant in terms of disre-
spect and a denial of public services to the black community. They are
akin to the failure of municipalities to provide paved, well-lit streets
and good schools for black neighborhoods. Race-of-victim discrimi-
nation sends an unseemly message that the overriding objective of
capital punishment in America is the protection of white people. This
has a real and direct racial edge. 154
The third class of victims, who are predominantly white, are the de-
fendants whose victims are white who would have received a life
rather than a death sentence if their victims had been black. How do
their injuries compare to the victims of race-of-defendant discrimina-
tion? From a comparative justice perspective, neither class of defend-
ants bears any responsibility for, or has any control over, the manner
in which the decision-making process is distorted by racial considera-
tions. Also, for both forms of discrimination, race (of either the de-
fendant or the victim) is a "but for" cause of what may be a fatal
charging or sentencing outcome.
However, when one introduces the traditional goal of antidis-
crimination law-the protection of minorities from adverse treatment
because of their race-the picture changes. In the case of black de-
fendants sentenced to death because they are black, their race is a
"but for" cause of their death sentences, which clearly implicates the
goal of antidiscrimination law. In contrast, race-of-victim discrimina-
tion does not harm a minority defendant because of his or her race.
Indeed the defendant's race, as noted above, is most commonly white.
The issue of racially discriminatory government policy that harms
white citizens has also arisen in the context of racial gerrymandering.
In Shaw v. Reno,155 a racial redistricting case, a congressional district
was drawn solely with the purpose of ensuring the election of a black
representative. When challenged, the defense was that "racial gerry-
mandering poses no ... constitutional difficulties when district lines
are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority."'1 56 In a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court rejected the argument on the ground that
"equal protection analysis 'is not dependent on the race of those bur-
153. KENNEDY, supra note 47, at 345.
154. However, the perceived salience of the harm is ameliorated somewhat by the lower level
of support for capital punishment in the black community-about 20-percentage points less sup-
port. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Also, as Randall Kennedy has noted, demand
for more law and order including capital punishment in some black communities is tempered by
"fear [of] racially prejudiced misconduct by law enforcement officers" if the law were enforced
more aggressively. See KENNEDY, supra note 47, at 75.
155. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
156. Id. at 650.
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dened or benefited by a particular classification.' ' 157 This holding
certainly runs against any suggestion that race-of-victim discrimina-
tion is unobjectionable because it comes principally at the expense of
white defendants.
A difference in perceived harm to the two classes of defendant vic-
tims (in race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimination) also
flows from the control each defendant exercises over his or her predic-
ament. The core of black defendants' claims of race-of-defendant dis-
crimination is that they are being punished for a factor over which
they have no control-their race. For defendants claiming race-of-vic-
tim discrimination, their heightened risk of a death sentence is the
product of a characteristic of the victims they selected.15 8 This distinc-
tion is legally irrelevant. We also view it as morally irrelevant because
it in no way addresses the core concerns about the immorality of race-
of-victim discrimination.
It is also useful to consider the "beneficiaries" of the two forms of
discrimination. The beneficiaries of race-of-defendant discrimination
are nonblack, generally white, offenders who receive more favorable
treatment than their black counterparts. In contrast, the beneficiaries
of race-of-victim discrimination are most commonly black defendants
whose victims are black. Indeed, these defendants represent the larg-
est pool of death-eligible offenders. 159
157. Id. at 650-51 (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). The
Shaw Court further added: "Indeed racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they
may be said to burden or benefit the races equally." Id. at 651.
158. Professor Schopp states: "It is difficult to sympathize with murderers who had the op-
portunity to protect themselves from such discrimination simply by refraining from committing
murder." Schopp, supra note 2, at 825. (However, this argument proves too much because a
defendant discriminated on the basis of his own race could similarly have avoided such discrimi-
nation by refraining from committing murder.)
159. See, e.g., Appendix Table 1, Part C, which indicates that in our post-Furman Georgia
research, black-on-black homicide constitutes 58% (1443/2484) of the cases. In PATERNOSTER &
BRAME, supra note 14, at 47 fig. 4, the figure is 48%. From a retributive perspective, the benefi-
ciaries have merely avoided their just deserts.
In terms of the impact of race-of-victim discrimination on black offenders, our Georgia re-
search documents that if defendants in black-victim cases had been sentenced to death at the
same rate as in similarly situated white-victim cases, two things would have occurred. First, the
number of death sentences would have increased substantially. Second, the proportion of black
defendants on death row would have increased by 20% to 25%. Alternatively, if an evenhanded
Georgia system had sentenced to death white-victim cases at the same rate as black-victim cases,
the total number of death sentences would have been significantly reduced. But in this situation,
as well, the proportion of black defendants on death row would have increased. Thus, it is clear
that race-of-victim discrimination redounds to the benefit of black defendants whose victims are
black even though it diminishes the black community's share of the retribution and deterrence
that may flow from capital punishment.
It is also possible to view as beneficiaries of race-of-victim discrimination supporters of capital
punishment, who on the basis of unadjusted disparities, note with approval the apparent absence
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In summary, we consider quite unpersuasive arguments, which seek
to minimize the moral implications of race-of-victim discrimination by
seeking to distinguish it from race-of-defendant discrimination on the
basis of characteristics of the victims and beneficiaries of the two
forms of discrimination. We believe these distinctions are unpersua-
sive because they fail to address the underlying sources of the immo-
rality of race-of-victim discrimination, which are: (a) its
undervaluation of black lives, (b) its distortion of the decision-making
process on the basis of race, (c) the fact that race is a but for cause of
many death sentences and executions, (d) the unfairness it visits upon
black communities, and (e) the unseemly message it sends that the
overriding objective of capital punishment in America is the protec-
tion of white people.
of black defendant discrimination in the current system. For these observers, race-of-victim dis-
crimination has an important and positive side effect because it enhances the perceived legiti-
macy of the current system. The reason it does is that in a system characterized by significant
race-of-victim discrimination, the unadjusted data on the comparative treatment of black and
white defendants is biased in a legitimating direction. Specifically, the unadjusted data suggest
such systems treat white defendants more punitively than black defendants. For example, na-
tionwide, the proportion of blacks on death row (40%) and the proportion of those executed
(35%) is significantly lower than the proportion of blacks among persons arrested for capital
murder (55% to 65%), suggesting that if there is any bias in the system, it is against white rather
than black defendants. See Table 1.
However, the adjusted data, which control simultaneously for the race of the defendant and
the victim, uniformly indicate that this is not the case. The downward biasing of unadjusted race-
of-defendants effects arises from the fact that the death- sentencing rate for the white defendants
is biased upward (because their victims are predominately white), while the death-sentencing
rate for the black defendants is biased downward (because the vast majority of victims in black
defendant cases are black). In this way, race-of-victim discrimination diminishes the overall per-
ception that black defendants are the victims of discrimination. For example, in his June 2001
review of race-of-defendant effects in the federal death penalty system, Attorney General Ash-
croft was at pains to point out that a smaller proportion of death-eligible blacks were capitally
charged by the attorney general than were the death-eligible whites. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 16-17 ("Decisions to seek the death penalty have been recommended and
approved in lower proportions of cases involving black or [H]ispanic defendants than white de-
fendants. There is nothing in these finding that suggests that the system involves racial or ethnic
bias against minorities."). Our preliminary analysis of the federal death-sentencing data clearly
suggests that the unadjusted race-of-defendant disparity, which is favorable to black defendants,
as pointed out by the AG, is strictly an artifact of race-of-victim discrimination in the system.
For a similar suggestion of bias against white defendants, see Stanley Rothman & Stephens Pow-
ers, Execution by Quota, PuB. INT., Summer 1994, at 3 ("[Slome findings suggest that blacks may
actually be treated more leniently than whites. If the legal system still discriminates against
blacks, why do they make up for a higher percentage of those charged with murder than those
executed for murder.").
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IV. RETHINKING THE "NECESSITY" FOR TOLERATING
RACE DISCRIMINATION
In spite of our society's commitment to race-neutral decision-mak-
ing and the rule of law, the nation has substantially acquiesced in the
toleration of race discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty. The acquiescence is justified on the ground that it is "neces-
sary" to preserve the benefits of capital punishment. This justifica-
tion, which is strongly implicit in Justice Powell's majority opinion in
McCleskey v. Kemp, rests on two beliefs.160 The first is that race dis-
crimination in the use of the death penalty is inevitable and wide-
spread (the inevitability claim). The second is that race discrimination
is ineradicable, which means that the prevention and correction of
race discrimination is impossible without the complete evisceration of
capital punishment or a material impairment of its benefits (the evis-
ceration claim). From this perspective, if federal law were to provide
a vehicle to present and adjudicate race claims, the death penalty sys-
tems of thirty-eight states would be brought to their knees under an
onslaught of race claims. Far better, the logic goes, to tolerate a less
than perfect system than to eviscerate capital punishment nationwide
in the name of equal justice. A decade ago, we examined how these
arguments and beliefs were effectively used to defeat the Racial Jus-
tice Act in Congress.' 61 They persist as a part of the conventional
wisdom offered to justify the toleration of race discrimination. From
this perspective, the impact of race discrimination on the legitimacy of
capital punishment is dismissed as de minimus. In this section, we
argue that post-Furman research draws into serious question the va-
lidity of both the inevitability and evisceration premises of the neces-
sity hypothesis.
160. Randall Kennedy believes that McCleskey was principally driven by a perception that
tolerance of discrimination was necessary because the remedies required to cure the problem
carried too high a price in terms of the continuing viability of the death penalty. Kennedy, supra
note 25, at 1414 ("The Justices have made the violations they are willing to recognize dependent
upon the remedies they are willing to provide. They have tailored declarations of rights to fit
their perceptions of acceptable remedies. Unpersuaded in McCleskey that an acceptable solu-
tion could be found, the Court obviated the remedial question simply by declining to find a
constitutional problem."); Blume et al., supra note 91, at 1778 (Thus, the Court feared that ruling
for McCleskey ... would threaten the validity of a large class of capital cases throughout Geor-
gia.") Others are even more explicit. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 70.
161. Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 378-85. They also featured prominently in the Kentucky
debates over the Racial Justice Act in the late 1990s. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:14111454
2004] THE INTERACTION OF FACT AND PERCEPTION 1455
A. The Belief that Discrimination is Widespread and Inevitable
Much of the post-Furman debate about the capacity of the law to
prevent and correct race discrimination has been based on a pre-
Furman perception of systemic racial discrimination as widespread
and inevitable. This premise underlies Justice Scalia's memo to the
Court during the McCleskey litigation, and it appears to have been
accepted by a majority of the Court. However, a considerable body of
research suggests that the reality of the post-Furman system is quite
different in that: (a) the problem is much less pervasive geographically
than generally understood; (b) systemic race-of-defendant discrimina-
tion is very much the exception rather than the rule; and (c) while
systemic race-of-victim discrimination continues to exist in a number
of places, it is far from universal. 162
B. The Belief that Efforts to Prevent or Remedy the Effects of Race
Discrimination Will Erase or Materially Impair the Use of the
Death Penalty
The evisceration claim has two premises. The first is a belief that
procedures designed to prevent race discrimination will materially im-
pair the utility of capital punishment. The second is that procedures
authorizing the adjudication of race claims will either "erase the death
penalty" altogether 163 or result in a distortion of the process that is far
162. As Robert Schopp properly points out, we know post-Furman that race discrimination is
neither universal nor inevitable. He makes the point in a discussion of the relative capacity of
legislatures and courts to eliminate race discrimination in public education compared to their
capacity to do so in the administration of the death penalty:
We have no obvious reason ... to think that our abilities to reduce discrimination in
application differ across the two institutions .... Arguably, we have good reason to
believe that this claim . . . is not true .... Early evidence, for example, provided
evidence of discrimination in capital sentencing by race of perpetrator. Later studies
did not find evidence of such discrimination by race of perpetrator, but these studies
did find evidence of discrimination by race of victim. A more recent study did not
reveal evidence of discrimination in capital sentencing by race of perpetrator or of vic-
tim, but it did find evidence suggesting discrimination by socioeconomic status of vic-
tim. This study also found evidence to support the interpretation that changes in the
relevant statutes and court practices had produced improvement in the consistency of
sentencing practices. This pattern of evidence across studies does not decisively demon-
strate that discrimination in capital sentencing can be eliminated, but it provides good
reason to doubt the contention that capital sentencing practices are not susceptible to
improvement.
Schopp, supra note 2, at 822.
163. Neal, supra note 24, at 14 (discussing an argument in the Kentucky legislature against the
Racial Justice Act in 1996); see also Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 380 (In debate over the
Federal Racial Justice Act, U.S. Senator Charles Grassley stated: "You cannot support the avail-
ability of capital punishment while supporting the Racial Justice Act."). According to the de-
facto abolition scenario, relief would be forthcoming for every black defendant and every defen-
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worse than the existing system. The record of the last decade in New
Jersey, Florida, Kentucky, and the federal death penalty system draw
into serious question both of these beliefs. The post-Furman record
also suggests that such procedures are likely to increase the even-
handedness of the system.
1. Prevention
It has been known for some time that the most effective means of
reducing the risk of race discrimination in the use of the death penalty
is a limitation of death sentencing to the most culpable offenders. 164
This was recognized in McCleskey v. Kemp,165 and a substantial body
of research in the last decade has confirmed the fact that race effects
are most prominent in cases with low- and mid-range aggravation
levels.166
Limiting death sentencing to the most aggravated cases also reduces
the risk of arbitrariness in death sentencing in general. The impor-
tance of this goal is clear in the jurisprudence of the United States
dant with a white victim, a totally unworkable prospect, which would deter prosecutors from
seeking death in any death-eligible cases. Id. at 380-81. An alternative scenario anticipates mas-
sive changes in prosecutorial charging practices to produce statistical parity in death-sentencing
outcomes, without regard to the merits of the cases. One approach would involve the use of
quotas to ensure that equal numbers or proportions of black-victim and white-victim cases are
charged capitally. Id. at 383 (U.S. Senator Gordon J. Humphrey stated in the RJA debate: "The
only way [the states] could possibly [use the death penalty] would be to deliberately use race as
the decisive factor in choosing to seek the death penalty or not in each case."). See also Roth-
man & Powers, supra note 159, at 3 (summarizing arguments against the RJA). Another
prosecutorial approach would be to charge all death-eligible cases capitally and refuse to negoti-
ate life sentence pleas in capital cases with the goal of producing the level of statistical parity
required to defend against race discrimination claims.
164. These offenders are often referred to as the "worst of the worst."
165. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 365, 366 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens did not dispute the goal of limiting death sentencing to the worst cases. He stated merely
that he did not believe the remedy was feasible on methodological grounds. Id. at 319 n.45.
166. For examples of analyses based on regression-based measures, see Appendix Figure 1
(pre-Furman Georgia race-of-victim effects), Appendix Figure 4 Part II (post-Furman Georgia
race-of-victim effects), and Appendix Figure 3 (Philadelphia-1978-2000-race-of-defendant ef-
fects). For examples employing the number of statutory aggravating circumstances as the mea-
sure of criminal culpability, see Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 595 fig. 19 (Nebraska 1973-1999,
race-of-defendant effects concentrated in one and two aggravator cases); David C. Baldus &
George Woodworth, Race of Victim and Race of Defendant Disparities in the Administration of
Maryland's Capital Charging and Sentencing System (1978-99): Preliminary Findings, at 7A fig. 3
(Feb. 15, 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (race-of-victim effects concen-
trated in cases with one or two statutory aggravating circumstances); at 7B fig.4 (black-defen-
dant/white-victim effects concentrated in cases with one or two statutory aggravating
circumstances).
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Supreme Court 167 and has been the focus of a considerable litera-
ture.168 This was also a motivation behind Attorney General Reno's
1995 creation of a federal system of prosecutorial review of all death-
eligible cases 169 and the recommendations of the Illinois task force on
capital punishment to limit sharply the number of death-eligible
crimes under Illinois law. 170
In terms of retribution, limiting death sentencing to the most aggra-
vated cases would retain capital punishment for the "most deserving"
crimes. Moreover, research indicates that these death sentences are
the most likely to be affirmed 171 and carried out with an actual execu-
tion.172 Limiting the death penalty to the most aggravated cases,
therefore, has only a marginal impact on the goals of capital punish-
ment while dramatically reducing the risk of race discrimination and
arbitrariness in the system.
Feasibility has three dimensions-methodological, substantive, and
political. First, do the decisionmakers have the methodology required
for the task? Second, do the decisionmakers have the competence to
limit death sentencing to the worst cases in a meaningful way? Third,
do the decisionmakers have the political room required for the task?
167. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2001) (Stevens, J.) ("Thus pursuant to our narrow-
ing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that on the most deserving of execution are put to
death, an exclusion of the mentally retarded is appropriate.")
168. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run on Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1 (1995) (concern about cost and burden on the judicial process given the few executions
that are actually carried out); JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., WHY THERE Is SO MUCH ERROR IN
CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT: A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II (2002),
available at http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=26641&PROACTIVE_
ID=cecfc6cecdcbcbc8c6c5cecfcfcfc5cececbcec8c8c7c8cbc8c5cf (last visited Apr. 10, 2004)
("Heavy use of the death penalty extending beyond highly aggravated homicides substantially
increases the risk of serious capital error.").
169. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Depart-
ment of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 503-04 (1999). "[Tjhe Department is, in my
view, unconsciously but inevitably giving effect to some version of the 'aggravated cases' solu-
tion advocated by Justice Stevens in McCleskey." Id. at 502-03.
170. TUROW, supra note 46, at 121-22 ("The commission unanimously [favored narrowing
death eligibility for murder] to a simpler and narrower group of eligibility criteria . . . two or
more [victims, police, fire, and correctional officers, obstruction of justice or torture]"). This
concern also motivated a recent legislative recommendation in Nebraska by Senator Brashear to
limit death sentencing to cases with two or more statutory aggravating circumstances of the
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravator. Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 682-83 n.412.
171. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 214 (Among Georgia death-sentenced cases
sorted by criminal culpability, the death sentence vacation rates in the Georgia Supreme Court
were 32% (11/34) for the least aggravated half of the cases and 18% (11/62) of the most aggra-
vated half of the cases.).
172. In a study of legal error in death sentence cases from 1973 through 1995, 18% of the
defendants with vacated death sentences were resentenced to death. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL.,
A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATE IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at pt. i (2000), available at
http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (executive summary).
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a. Methodological Feasibility
In McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice John Paul Stevens recommended
that death sentencing be limited to categories of cases in which "pros-
ecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose the death
penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the offender.' 73
His proposal, quite simply, was to apply a death sentencing "fre-
quency" test designed to limit death sentencing to the most aggra-
vated cases.
Justice Powell rejected Justice Stevens's proposal as "unconvinc-
ing," on two methodological grounds.174 The first was his belief that
the application of Justice Stevens's frequency test required a substan-
tial database and statistical analysis that "focused particularly on the
community in which the crime was committed. 1 75 Justice Powell's
second argument focused on the difficulty of identifying, with regres-
sion-based measures of culpability, the category of "death-eligible"
cases to which the charging and sentencing frequency standard would
be applied.1 76
There is some force to Justice Powell's concern about relying on
regression-based scales to identify the most culpable offenders.1 77
However, research conducted since McCleskey indicates that a much
more straightforward measure of offender culpability-the number of
statutory aggravating circumstances in the cases-provides a very
good means of identifying the cases in which death sentences are quite
consistently sought and imposed. 178 The number of statutory ag-
gravators is highly correlated with the offender's overall culpability
and correlates strongly with regression-based measures of culpability.
173. 481 U.S. at 1781, 1806.
174. Id. at 279 n.45. Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1414, argues that the McCleskey Court's
failure to perceive a remedy that would not seriously impair the utility of capital punishment was
the principal motivation for the Court's refusal to recognize McCleskey's substantive rights.
175. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 381 n.45.
176. Id. These concerns have been noted by others. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 25, at
1432.
177. These concerns have been noted by others. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1432.
178. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 111 tbl. 16 (documenting, among Georgia cases,
a strong similarity in death sentencing "frequencies" when criminal culpability is measured in
terms of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances and a regression-based scale);
Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 552 fig. 3; id. at 559 fig. 6 (documenting the relationship in Ne-
braska cases between the number of statutory aggravating circumstances and a regression-based
scale as measures of criminal culpability). See also supra note 166 (discussing alternative mea-
sures of criminal culpability) and see text accompanying Appendix n.271 (discussion of the inter-
action between offender criminal culpability and the risk of race discrimination).
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Drawing lines on this basis requires neither large databases nor com-
plicated statistical analyses. 179
Since Furman v. Georgia, the utility of this measure has been docu-
mented in two systems of comparative proportionality review. The
first is the system of comparative proportionality review applied by
the Florida Supreme Court, which uses the number of statutory aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances as the principal measure of of-
fender culpability.180 During the 1990s, the court vacated 19% (32/
170) of the death sentences it reviewed on grounds of disproportional-
ity.181 The principal defining measure in this review process was the
number of aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing
judge.182 Almost exclusively, the vacated death sentences were based
on one or two aggravating circumstances.1 83
The second example is the proportionality review procedure con-
ducted by Nebraska trial courts. 184 A recent study of this process over
a twenty-five-year period documented that the number of statutory
aggravators in the cases is clearly the most important factor in explain-
ing who is sentenced to death.185 The cases in which comparative
culpability was the principal basis for the imposition of a life sentence
overwhelmingly involved a single statutory aggravator. 186
179. Another alternative is to limit death eligibility to cases with multiple aggravators and
single aggravator cases with levels of culpability comparable to cases with two or more ag-
gravators. Baldus, supra note 38, at 680-82.
180. See generally Ken Driggs, The Most Aggravated and Heart Mitigated Murders: Capital
Proportionality Review in Florida, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207 (1999) (overview by a public
defender with extensive experience in Florida).
181. This analysis is limited to cases in which the court reached the proportionality issue.
Cases vacated on procedural grounds were not included in this study.
182. Philip L. Durham, "Review" in Name Alone: The Rise and Fall of Comparative Propor-
tionality Review of Capital Sentences by the Florida Supreme Court (2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
183. The vacation rates from 1989 through 1999 were as follows: One statutory aggravator-
55% (12/22); two aggravators- 37% (17/46) and three or more aggravators-3% (3/107).
Among the less aggravated cases, the number of mitigating factors also had an influence. Id. at
26 fig. 5.
184. Nebraska is the only state in which trial courts rather than appellate courts conduct com-
parative proportionality reviews of death sentences.
185. Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 553 (in a logistic multiple regression analysis, the odds that
death-eligible defendants would be sentenced to death were enhanced by a factor of 12 with
presence of each additional statutory aggravating circumstance).
186. We also provide below more details on the Nebraska review process, infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
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b. Substantive and Political Feasibility
We focus here on courts and prosecutors that sought to limit death
sentencing to the worst cases during the 1990s. 187 That experience
suggests that the effectiveness of such procedures depends on four
features of the process: (a) the richness of the available data;188 (b) the
perceived reasonableness of the review standards; (c) transparency of
the database and the process of decision; and (d) the visibility and
political risk associated with the process. That experience also indi-
cates that rich data, reasonable standards, and transparency give the
system legitimacy. Transparency also provides a feed back mechanism
to inform prosecutorial charging decisions. Low visibility and minimal
interference with death sentences imposed by courts and juries mini-
mizes political risk. 189
i. New Jersey
In 1992, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a system of com-
parative proportionality review with a rich transparent database ac-
cessible to the parties, an extensive conceptual framework and process
of decision, and a one-way channel of communication with the
prosecutorial community through its judicial opinions.190 Although
187. There may well be more such efforts, but we are limited in our inquiry to the systems on
which we have data.
188. Richness refers to comprehensiveness.
189. We first developed this framework in David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on
the Future of Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582, 1583-85
(1996).
190. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992). Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality
Review of Capital Cases By State High Courts After Gregg." Only "The Appearance of Justice"? 87
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 196-97 (1996) (describing the process through which the court
in its opinions urged the adoption or guidelines to guide prosecutorial charging decisions and the
joint decision of the county prosecutors association and the Attorney General to adopt such
guidelines). The New Jersey system has a McCleskey-like database that embraces each death-
eligible case in the system. Id. at 190-94 (describing the process of record gathering).
Although the court applies some statistical methods, its core comparative proportionality
analyses are based on common sense lawyer like case-by-case comparisons. In re Proportional-
ity Review Project (I), 735 A.2d 528, 543 (N.J. 1999) ("To sum up, one of the participants has
observed that conducting proportionality review is not like completing the Human Genome Pro-
ject. We are identifying and then sorting, by very familiar characteristics, about thirty to thirty-
five cases per year."). See also State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798 (N.J. 2002) (a recent applica-
tion). This stands in contrast to the court's efforts to scrutinize its system for race discrimination,
for which it employs a variety of statistical approaches. See supra note 138.
In its individual case reviews, the court utilizes the services of a special master, commonly a
retired judge, who, for each case to be reviewed, prepares a report that pulls together detailed
information on the most relevant measures of criminal culpability and comparison cases. The
masters have also prepared reports on methodological issues raised by the parties and the
master. In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757 A.2d 168, 177 (N.J. 2000); see also David
S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New Jersey Experience, 39 CRIM. L. BULL.
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the New Jersey court is highly respected, it has been criticized for its
high standards in the review of death cases, which allegedly causes
delays in executions, 91 and the proportionality review procedures it
has applied, in part against the wishes of the legislature. 192 In re-
sponse, the court adopted conservative substantive standards to guide
its reviews and has vacated only one death sentence as disproportion-
ate in twelve years. 193 In our judgment, the most important feature of
227 (2003) (report of the current master on the history and role of the special master); JUDGE
DAVID S. BAIME, SPECIAL MASTER, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER ON PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW: STATE V. CHARLES REDDISH (2002) (master's report on State v. Reddish).
191. Proportionality Review (1), 735 A.2d 528 at 541.
192. In 1992, the New Jersey Legislature directed the New Jersey Supreme Court to limit the
universe of cases it uses in its proportionality review to death-sentenced cases. The court has
ignored this direction and continues to embrace within its universe of comparison cases all factu-
ally death-eligible defendants. Proportionality Review (1), 735 A.2d at 535-36, 543-44. Neverthe-
less, it has not confronted the legislature directly by declaring the legislation unconstitutional.
State v. Papasavvas, 790 A.2d 798 (N.J. 2002) (continuing to apply the broader group of compar-
ison cases); Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases
(with Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (2001). However, the limits of the
court's political space on death penalty issues are symbolized by two constitutional amendments
(initiated by the state legislature) that overruled two rulings of the court that had been based on
the New Jersey constitution. The first amendment overruled the court's holding that intent to
cause serious bodily injury, in the absence of intent to kill, could not sustain a capital murder
conviction; the second constitutional amendment overruled the court's ban on the use of victim
impact statements in criminal cases generally. John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New
Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Cast, Same Script, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 773 (2003). See also Bienen, supra note 190 at 207-12 (chronicling
long standing tensions between the Supreme Court and the Legislature and the Governor on a
variety of issues among which the court's capital punishment jurisprudence was prominent).
193. Papasavvas, is the sole death sentence vacated on the ground of comparative excessive-
ness. Since 1992, the court appears to have abandoned concerns about consistency (i.e., the
frequency with which death sentences are imposed among similarly situated defendants.) The
reason appears to be that the level of death sentencing among most categories of New Jersey
cases is so low that a faithful following of the reasoning of Furman v. Georgia (in which the
Georgia death-sentencing system, which the Court held to be excessive, yielded an average
death-sentencing rate of about 0.15) would compel the New Jersey court to vacate a substantial
proportion of New Jersey's post-Furman death sentences as comparatively excessive. Propor-
tionality Review (1), 735 A.2d 528 at 530 ("Because New Jersey jurors have been sparing in their
imposition of the death sentences, it will never be the case that death would be 'generally re-
ceived' or 'received in a defined preponderance of cases' . . . we have recognized that 'death
need not be normal or general to be a licit sentence."') Instead, as is clear in Papasavvas, the
court's principal focus is on the selectivity of the system (i.e., whether death sentences being
limited to the most aggravated cases). Death sentences not so limited are characterized as "ab-
errational," a judgment which often turns on quite subjective comparative culpability judgments,
as contrasted with the more empirically based judgments that underlie a consistency analysis.
Id. at 544-48 (Handler, J., dissenting) (critique of the court's evolving standards). Justice Han-
dler's dissenting opinions in proportionality review cases in the 1990s give one an idea of the
impact those reviews would have had if the court had strictly applied the reasoning of Furman v.
Georgia; there is little support on the court for such strong judicial intervention. Indeed, the
Papasavvas decision, that vacated a death sentence as excessive, split four to three. Wefing,
supra note 192, at 778 "The opinions of this closely divided court [in Papassavas] illustrate the
great difficulty the court encounters in conducting a proportionality review." See supra note 119.
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New Jersey's proportionality review system is its feedback mechanism
with the prosecutorial community, 194 which, over time, appears to
have developed a fairly conservative approach to capital charging.
For example, between the early 1980s (1983 to 1987) and the later
1980s (1988 to 1991), the rate that death-eligible cases advanced to
penalty trial declined 35% (20/62)-from 62% (95/154) in the earlier
period to 40% (37/92) in the later period.195 Over this same time pe-
riod, the jury death-sentencing rate declined 60%-from 35% (1983
to 1987) to 14% (1988 to 1991).196 Both sets of changes reduced the
death-sentencing rate among all death-eligible cases from 22% (34/
154) in the earlier period to 5% (5/92) in the later period. 197
Since 1992, the rates of capital charging and jury death sentencing
are unknown. 198 However, we do know that the absolute number of
death sentences has further declined since 1992, although the reasons
for the decline are less clear. 199 Moreover, since 1992, prosecutors ap-
pear generally to have made significant efforts to limit capital prose-
cutions to the most aggravated cases. 2°° In terms of visibility, the New
194. Gerald J. Russello, The New Jersey Supreme Court: New Directions?, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 655, 688 (2002) (a former law clerk on the New Jersey court stating that
"[ovierall ... the Court seems committed, at least for now, to follow its precedents.... The
effects of ... proportionality review are still unclear, but may represent confidence to let the
state authorities proceed at their own pace with less intensive oversight from the judiciary.")
195. This decline appears principally to reflect the impact of the New Jersey court's efforts to
narrow the scope of death eligibility in terms of the mens rea required for capital murder and
breadth of individual statutory aggravating circumstances. Specifically, in eighteen successive
decisions between 1987 and 1990, the New Jersey court vacated or reduced a death sentence or
reversed a capital murder conviction on the basis of legal error. Because of these decisions, 17%
(5/29) of the death sentences imposed in the early years (1983-1987) were later deemed to have
been imposed in cases that were not even death-eligible. SPECIAL MASTER DAVID C. BALDUS,
FINAL REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY RE-
VIEW PROJECT, tbl. 2 (1991).
196. Id. at tbls. 2, 3.
197. These rates are computed from data. Id. at tbls. 1, 3.
198. These rates are unknown because the New Jersey court no longer requests the master for
proportionality review to compute and report this information in his periodic reports.
199. In terms of raw numbers of death sentences, we know that in the first six years of the
system (1983-1988), the average number was six. In the following three years (1989-1991) the
annual average number dropped to 1.3. Id. at tbls. 1, 2. That level continued immediately after
the introduction of proportionality review in 1992 (1992-1994). After a slight increase in the
1995-1997 period (three per annum), the rate leveled off at one per year (1998-2003). E-mail
from Mark Friedman, New Jersey Assistant Deputy Public Defender, to David Baldus (Mar. 4,
2004) (on file with authors). One possible explanation for the drop in death sentences in the last
five years may be a decline in jury death sentencing rates (perhaps motivated by heightened
concerns about miscarriages of justice) and continuing selectivity in prosecutorial charging.
200. This opinion is based in part on the judgment of New Jersey public defenders Dale Jones
and Joseph Krakora who recently stated: "We believe that one of the very apparent trends in
New Jersey capital litigation is the greater selectivity on the part of county prosecutors as to the
cases they are making capital. There are only twenty or so open cases in the state, three of which
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Jersey court has distinctly avoided an aggressive top down inter-
vention review process involving the routine vacation of death senten-
ces.201 It has essentially opted for a process of communication that
informs the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A compelling argu-
ment can be made that this enterprise has enjoyed a reasonable mea-
sure of success in limiting death sentencing to highly aggravated
cases.
202
ii. Florida
In the early 1990s, the Florida Supreme Court, a highly visible insti-
tution, especially with respect to its death penalty jurisprudence, de-
veloped a meaningful system of comparative proportionality review
that relied on a rich and transparent database with well reasoned
opinions.20 3 As noted above, during the 1990s, the court vacated 19%
are multiple defendant cases. We believe that the large majority of the pending cases are highly
aggravated in the sense that there seemed to be little or no room to question why the death
penalty was being sought." E-mail to David Baldus (Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with authors).
Our opinion is also based on a review of the aggravation levels of the cases in which juries
have returned death sentences since 1994. For the eighteen death sentenced cases for which we
have data, State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004); State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074 (N.J. 2002);
State v. Nelson, 803 A.2d 1 (N.J. 2002); State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144 (N.J. 2001); State v.
Timmendequas, 773 A.2d 18 (N.J. 2001); State v. Feaster, 757 A.2d 266 (N.J. 2000); State v. (Am-
brose) Harris, 757 A.2d 221 (N.J. 2000); State v. Morton, 757 A.2d 184 (N.J. 2000); State v.
Papasavvas, 751 A.2d 40 (N.J. 2000); State v. Simon, 737 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1999); State v. Harvey, 731
A.2d 1121 (N.J. 1999); State v. Chew, 731 A. 2d 1070 (N.J. 1999); State v. Cooper, 731 A.2d 1000
(N.J. 1999); State v. Hightower, 680 A.2d 239 (N.J. 1996); State v. DiFrisco, 662 A.2d 442 (N.J.
1995); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308 (N.J. 1995); State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949 (N.J. 1994); and
State v. Brown, 651 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1994), in only three (Chew, Feaster, and Mejia) did the Govern-
ment appear to rely on a single statutory aggravating. Overall, for these eighteen cases, the state
alleged an average of 2.3 statutory aggravator. Also, a recent study of New Jersey death sentenc-
ing in the 1980s suggests that the system was reasonably selective before the court's proportion-
ality review process was adopted in 1992. Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 656-58 (comparing the
selectivity and consistency of New Jersey and Nebraska death-sentencing outcomes).
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text on the court's political space in death penalty
cases. On this issue, it is useful to contrast the New Jersey with the Florida systems see infra note
203 and accompanying text (Florida); supra note 190 and accompanying text (New Jersey).
202. There are, however, less sanguine views of the New Jersey experience. See, e.g., Joseph
R. McCarthy, Implications of County Variance in New Jersey Capital Murder Cases: Arbitrary
Decision-Making by County Prosecutors, 19 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. R-s. 969, 994 (2003) (The New
Jersey system has "allowed prosecutors to exercise virtually unbridled discretion in capital mur-
der cases. Without standards [on which] to base their decisions and without a higher authority to
hold them accountable, county prosecutors continue to apply the capital murder laws of New
Jersey in a freakish and arbitrary manner. Special Master Baimes's study has confirmed that the
capital murder laws in New Jersey operate very much like being struck by lightning.").
203. See Driggs, supra note 180; Durham, supra note 182. The Florida court's system of pro-
portionality review has seen no equal in the post-Furman period. It was explicitly motivated by
the objective of limiting death sentencing to highly aggravated cases with no or few mitigating
circumstances. The database for the project consists of all prior comparative review decisions of
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(32/170) of the death cases it reviewed on this issue, 20 4 although the
overall impact of this policy on systemic consistency and the risk of
race discrimination is unknown. However, the practice was scaled
back dramatically in 2000 after the Florida court came under severe
political attack 20 5 from the Governor and the Republican-controlled
legislature for allegedly slowing unreasonably the pace of the execu-
tions in state.206 The 19% vacation rate on the proportionality issue in
the 1990s dropped to 3% (3/97) between 2000 and 2003.207 The mes-
sage from the experience of the Florida court is clear. Whatever a
court's commitment to selective and consistent death sentencing may
be, top-down, highly visible, and aggressive review practices may carry
distinct political risks.
the Florida court, all of which were available to the parties. The proportionality opinions of the
court were fully explained and documented with respect to comparison cases.
204. Driggs, supra note 180, at 274-75 ("While I have my own strenuous disagreements with
the [court] in individual proportionality cases, I have to acknowledge that they take this aspect
of their death penalty jurisprudence seriously.").
205. Baldus, supra note 189, at 1583 (discussing "the tolerance for resistance to the death
penalty by public officials," which varies greatly from place to place).
206. The long-standing issue that drew the court into a power struggle with the legislature and
Governor Jeb Bush was the perceived frequency with which the court vacated death sentences
and its toleration of excessive delays in the execution of death sentences arising from the filing of
state post-conviction claims and appeals. In the view of one observer, the bottom line was that
the Governor and a number of legislators were "envious that Texas, Missouri, and Virginia are
executing more death row inmates and taking less time at it." Marvin Dyckman, Playing Death-
Penalty Politics, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at 9A. To address this problem, legislative
leaders and the Governor developed a two-prong legislative and constitutional strategy. The
first was the enactment of legislation to limit the number, timing, and grounds for death penalty
appeals. To no one's surprise, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously held the law to be an
unconstitutional encroachment on its rule making authority. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d
52, 59 (Fla. 2000) (legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Florida Constitu-
tion); Randolph Pendleton, Court Voids Death Appeals Laws: Justices Will Pass Rules To Speed
Process, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Apr. 15, 2000, available at http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-on-
line/stories/041500/met_2793441.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
Anticipating this decision, the Governor and a number of legislators proposed constitutional
amendments that would permit the legislature to write the procedural rules controlling death
penalty appeals. Randolph Pendleton, Slowdown on Expediting Appeals, FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://www.Jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/120299/met-
1406451.html (last visited May 10, 2004). There were also legislative proposals to give the Gov-
ernor substantially more power over the appointment of appellate judges. Randolph Pendleton,
GOP Seeks New Rules for Courts, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 28, 2000, available at http://
www.Jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/ 032800/met_2585696.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
207. For five justices who served during the entire period from 1900 through 2003, Durham,
supra note 182, at 46 figs. 26-27, documents sharp declines (for the 2000-2003 period) in the
proportion of one and two aggravating circumstances cases in which they voted to vacate death
sentences as comparatively excessive. During the 1990s, the court was sharply divided on its
proportionality review practices. Thus, it required only a few converts to alter the trend of the
court's proportionality review decisions. Also, the two Jeb Bush appointees to the court during
the later period, Raoul G. Cantero, III (2002) and Kenneth B. Bell (2003), did not vote to vacate
a death sentence as excessive in the few cases they heard. Id. at 47 n.111.
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iii. Nebraska and the federal government
In contrast to the New Jersey and Florida systems of proportionality
review, the review systems in Nebraska (trial court proportionality re-
view) and the federal government (centralized pretrial Main Justice
screening for proportionality) are characterized by low visibility and
low political risk. The Nebraska system has low visibility because the
proportionality reviews are conducted by trial court sentencing judges
before sentence is imposed, thereby avoiding the costly choice of over-
riding a death sentence already imposed by a judge (Florida) or jury
(New Jersey).20 8 The Nebraska review process is reasonably rich in
data and quite transparent, giving prosecutors a good sense of the out-
comes they can expect in capital cases. Overall, the Nebraska system
appears to have been reasonably successful in minimizing the risk of
arbitrariness and race discrimination in charging and sentencing.20 9
The federal review system screens death-eligible cases to identify
candidates who are ultimately approved by the Attorney General for
capital prosecution. 210 The AG's decisions are based on recommenda-
tions of a panel of prosecutors in Main Justice who screen all cases in
the system. The process has low visibility because participation and
208. As noted above, post-Furman death sentencing in Nebraska has always been a trial court
judicial function in which the trial courts conduct proportionality review. In that task they have
the help of various files of case listings and descriptions to inform those judgments. Each deci-
sion is in the public domain but not easily accessible statewide. Moreover, the opinions vary
widely in terms of the facts of the review and comparison cases as well as the quality of the
reasoning supporting the final proportionality review decision. The upshot of the system is a
reasonably consistent pattern of death sentences that is quite comparable to New Jersey's.
Unlike the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Nebraska Supreme Court does not monitor its
system for race effects. Nevertheless, a recent well-controlled study of Nebraska case law
reveals no significant evidence of race-of-defendant or race-of-victim discrimination in charging
and sentencing decisions. (However, it does show pronounced disparities based on the socioeco-
nomic status of the victims.) Baldus et al., supra note 38, at 607-23. Also, because Nebraska's
proportionality reviews are conducted before the judges impose sentence, the process has very
low visibility and appears to create no political risk for the sentencing judges who are required to
stand for a retention election every six years.
209. Id. at 643-61 (quantitative and qualitative analyses of consistency and selectivity in Ne-
braska death sentencing).
210. In 1995, Attorney General Reno established a capital punishment review process at Main
Justice in which every death-eligible case is screened to see if it is among the most aggravated
and deserving of a capital prosecution. The review panel does not appear to engage formally in
a comparative analysis of each case, but, because the panel's members serve for extended peri-
ods, they have familiarity with a vast number of cases that provide the basis for their compara-
tive judgments. The standards used by the panel are unknown beyond a desire to limit death
sentencing to the worst federal cases. Defense counsel are generally permitted to participate in
the proceeding, but they do not have access to the database of cases available to the panel
members. The procedure screens out a very large percentage of the cases with the result that
fewer than 25% of the death-eligible cases are authorized for capital prosecution by the AG.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27.
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knowledge of the process beyond the review panel is limited to the
U.S. Attorneys and defense counsel. While the AG's system does not
employ a systemic database known to the parties, the review panel
considers hundreds of thoroughly documented cases, giving its mem-
bers a good sense of the relative culpability of the homicides it re-
views. The recommendations and decisions of the panel and the AG
provide U.S. Attorneys with good feedback on the AG's perception of
the most culpable offenders. Although the facts of the federal cases
are normally known to the public only when they result in a death
sentence, compared to the state court cases of which we are aware, the
capitally charged cases in the federal system appear to be quite aggra-
vated. On the issue of race, the review process in Washington is race-
blind, but the decision-making processes of the U.S. Attorneys and
the law enforcement personnel, who identify and charge defendants
capitally, are not.211 It is partly for this reason that the National Insti-
tute of Justice has undertaken a study of the impact of race in the
federal system.212
In sum, these case studies suggest that prosecutors are in the strong-
est position to limit death sentencing to the worst cases with low polit-
ical risk. This result appears to hold whether the prosecutorial
screening process is informal (New Jersey and Nebraska) or formal
(the federal review system). The evidence also suggests that courts
have the capacity to influence prosecutorial decision making through
informal feedback mechanisms based on systems of proportionality
review that are data rich, well reasoned, and transparent. However,
when proportionality reviews are conducted at the appellate level, de-
cisions to overturn death verdicts imposed by juries and judges must
be tempered by the state's political environment with respect to capi-
tal punishment.
C. Adjudicating Claims of Discrimination
We also have experience in the 1990s with two procedures (New
Jersey and Kentucky) designed to adjudicate claims of discrimination.
The New Jersey court scrutinizes its system for evidence of systemic
discrimination, while the Kentucky system, under its Racial Justice
211. Little, supra note 169, at 411-12. Rory Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think:
The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt and the Specter of Timothy Mc-
Veigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591 (2004) ("The line prosecutor and lead investigators often have a
large, if not primary, influence on the charging and sentencing contours of potential federal
death penalty cases .... [If race effects exist in the system, they] occur at the earliest stages:
case investigation and prosecutorial intake.").
212. See supra note 124.
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Act, focuses on prosecutorial charging decisions in individual cases.
According to the evisceration claim, the application of such systems
will result in the de facto abolition of the death penalty, substantially
impair its utility, or result in the use of racial quotas; this theory fur-
ther asserts that, with respect to race-of-victim discrimination, such
remedies will result in a dramatic increase of death sentencing in
black-victim cases, which will increase the proportion of black defend-
ants on death row. The experience of the last decade in Kentucky and
New Jersey provides a basis for assessing the validity of such claims.
1. Kentucky's Racial Justice Act
Kentucky's Racial Justice Act (RJA), adopted in July 1998, is
modeled after the Federal Racial Justice Act, which Congress rejected
in 1994. The evidentiary framework under the Kentucky law is based
on models of proof used to challenge the discriminatory use of per-
emptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky.2 13 The Kentucky statute
permits a capital murder defendant to bar a penalty trial in his or her
case on the ground that "race was the basis of the decision to seek" a
death sentence "in his or her case. ' 214 The Act appears to contem-
plate the presentation of evidence solely from the county of prosecu-
tion 215 and the claim must be established by "clear and convincing
evidence."
In this section, we present the results of a 2002 survey of Kentucky
public defenders that gathered their perceptions of the impact and sig-
nificance of the statute;216 we also present an analysis of death-sen-
tencing trends before and after the effective date of the statute that
sheds light on its impact.
213. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
214. Kentucky Racial Justice Act, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300-532.309 (Michie 2004). The
Kentucky statute is distinguishable from the federal proposal in its exclusive focus on the
prosecutorial charging decision ("No person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death that
was sought on the basis of race.") (emphasis added)), as contrasted to the federal proposal,
which forbids "the execution of a sentence that was imposed based on race." Baldus et al., supra
note 72, at 424-25.
215. There is, however, ambiguity on the geographic scope of the authorized proof. Section 2
of the Kentucky Racial Justice Act speaks of proof that race "was a significant factor in decisions
to seek the death penalty in the Commonwealth" (emphasis added) implying that statewide evi-
dence of discrimination is relevant, while Section 4 requires proof that race was a factor in the
"decision to seek a death sentence in his or her case" suggesting that proof is limited to evidence
concerning charging decisions in the defendant's judicial district.
216. Neal, supra note 24. The questionnaire was administered by the Kentucky Department
of Public Advocacy to provide a basis for advising Senator Neal on how the legislation was
implemented. It was sent to over 275 attorneys. E-mail from Edward C. Monahan, Deputy
Public Advocate, Department of Public Advocacy to David Baldus, (Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with
authors).
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Of the sixty-four survey respondents, four had filed RJA claims and
eight were aware of others having done so, but no direct relief (as
contrasted to discovery and related orders) had been granted on any
RJA claim.21 7 The responses of the public defenders address several
topics. The first topic concerns the evidentiary and judicial impedi-
ments to defense counsel's use of the statute. A major impediment is
the limitation of proof to the prosecutor's judicial district.218 Even in
a large judicial district like Jefferson County (City of Louisville), with
defendants and victims of different races, the number of death-eligible
cases is too small to obtain statistically significant results with respect
to a given prosecutor, and the local courts have not authorized funds
for a statewide analysis.21 9 Another impediment is the refusal of
many judges to grant discovery motions requesting an order that
would require the prosecutor to: (a) reveal general "office policy" on
capital charging, or (b) explain on a case-by-case basis, the factual cri-
teria the prosecutor has used historically to decide which cases were
and were not capitally charged.220 The problem is that the matter is
strictly within the discretion of the trial courts that apply their discre-
tion narrowly out of an apparent concern with stigmatizing prosecu-
217. Nor has any direct relief been granted on a RJA claim since 2002.
218. In the words of one defender: "The requirement of showing race-based-decision-making
in one particular case is a MAJOR burden. I had thought that the RJA would relieve us of that
burden rather than codify it." Neal, supra note 24, at 19.
219. Bette Niemi, Manager, Department of Public Advocacy, Capital Trial Branch, reports
that "we couldn't get any statistician to analyze" the Louisville data because the "relatively small
number of cases would not produce a statistically significant result. Everyone we spoke to was of
the opinion that the only statistically significant result would come from a state wide analysis
that would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and take several years to complete." E-mail
from Bette Niemi to David Baldus via Susan Balliet (Mar. 9, 2004) (on file with authors) [herein-
after Niemi E-mail]. The refusal of the courts to authorize a statewide study is regrettable given
the excellent foundation that Professors Keil and Vito's statewide study, supra note 21, would
have provided for such an effort. Another defender referred to the "virtually gargantuan" diffi-
culty (in cost and expertise) of developing a meaningful database and the lack of generally ac-
cepted measures of offender culpability that can be used to identify and match similarly situated
cases. Neal supra note 24, at 19.
220. Bette Niemi reports that "[n]ot one judge in Jefferson County [Louisville] required dis-
closure." Id. See also Neal supra note 24, at 13 (reporting details of two judicial denials of
defense counsel requests to "discover the policy" and for evidentiary hearings.). However, in at
least one district, a discovery motion produced an order requiring a prosecutor to provide de-
tailed information about all of the death-eligible cases he had prosecuted during his tenure, and
explain for each case why he did or did not seek a death sentence. Although the prosecutor's
testimony revealed nothing that appeared inappropriate, a plea offer was forthcoming and de-
fense counsel was of the opinion that the "RJA was one factor leading to a favorable settle-
ment." Id. There is also an expectation among many defense counsel that even if prosecutors
are required to disclose the bases of their charging decisions in individual cases, most judges
would accept at face value any reasons offered to justify those decisions.
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tors with any suggestion that race may be a factor in their charging
decisions.
Another consequence of trial court limitations of the evidence to
individual judicial districts is that communities with no or very few
minority defendants and victims (which includes the bulk of Ken-
tucky's counties) are beyond the effective reach of the legislation.2 21
Moreover, the legislation's exclusive focus on prosecutorial charging
decisions impairs its potential for identifying significant overall race
effects in the system beyond the charging decision. The reason for this
is that Professors Keil and Vito's research documented significant race
effects in both prosecutorial charging decisions and jury sentencing
decisions. Limiting the focus of the law to race effects in prosecutorial
decisions may be overlooking an important source of the problem.
The most useful approach would commence with a separate focus on
the charging and sentencing decisions that is supplemented with an
analysis of the combined effects of the two decision points, which doc-
uments race disparities in the imposition of death sentences among all
death-eligible cases.222
A final but important impediment to defense counsel's use of the
RJA appears to be concern about stigmatizing and thereby antagoniz-
ing prosecutors merely by raising a claim. The following are two
explanations:
1. The claim that a prosecutor is racist is explosive and produces a
fear that he or she will retaliate against defense counsel in this
or other cases;223 and
2. "Arguing in a high-profile case that the local prosecutor is ap-
plying the law in a racist manner does not foster positive rela-
tionships in that particular case or in the thousands of case[s]
between the defender's office and the Commonwealth. There
could be dire consequences on the success of counsel in the im-
mediate case and perhaps scores of other case[s], while the
prosecutor cools down from being called a racist in the local
paper."224
221. One defender notes: "Almost without exception, my cases involve white defendants,
charged with killing white victims, in jurisdictions which are 95+% white, where no member of a
minority race has been charged with murder, or has been a murder victim, within anyone's mem-
ory." Neal, supra note 24, at 18-19.
222. A focus on charging and sentencing decisions as well as on the combined impact of both
prosecutorial and jury decisions is characteristic of death penalty research in Georgia-Baldus et
al., supra note 8; New Jersey-Baldus &Woodworth, supra note 17, at 221-22; Maryland-PA-
TERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14; Philadelphia-Baldus et al., supra note 22; and Nebraka-
Baldus et al., supra note 38.
223. Neal, supra note 24, at 18.
224. Id. These reactions are understandable given the stigmatizing effects of racist labels. See
supra note 25. The costs of such labels are particularly high for prosecutors seeking political
advancement in interracial communities where RJA claims are most likely.
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Respondents also suggest that the stigmatizing effect of RJA claims
underlies the frequent judicial reluctance to recognize such claims.225
In spite of these problems, a number of the defense counsel respon-
dents perceived some value from the RJA. One is the symbolic effect
of the law. Most defenders perceive it as legitimating claims of race
discrimination by representing a state acknowledgement that bias is
possible and the state is trying to rectify the situation.226 A minority
view is that the statute gives a misleading impression that "we have a
fair and even handed judicial system. ' 227
A number of respondents also perceived a positive influence on
some prosecutors. One defender's view is that, because of the law's
symbolic effect, it brings the issue out into the open. Some defenders
also perceive a deterrent effect in that, with the expectation of addi-
tional scrutiny of their charging decisions, some prosecutors are likely
to examine more closely the basis of these decisions. 228 Also, in some
cases, a prosecutor's desire to avoid the necessity of justifying his or
her decisions has helped induce, particularly in close cases, plea offers
or unilateral death notice withdrawals without the necessity of filing
an RJA claim. The evidence suggests, therefore, that the fear of stig-
matization, which inhibits the exercise of judicial discretion, in some
cases influences the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a positive
direction.
In addition, several defense counsel perceived a negative influence
in prosecutorial decisions also arising from a fear of stigmatization. 229
225. Claims of "any form of racism" do not sit well with judges "who know and in most cases
respect the prosecution." Neal, supra note 24, at 19. In spite of apparent judicial resistance to
the RJA, the circumstances of a 2003 case suggest it very likely had a positive effect in jury
selection for the trial of a black male defendant in a district where blacks constitute only about
4.5% of the population. At the outset, the Commonwealth moved for a "severely limited indi-
vidual voir dire." Defense counsel filed an RJA motion, which included a request for "individual
voir dire sufficient to deal with the reality of racial discrimination." The court denied the RJA
request to bar a capital prosecution but permitted a three and one-half week voir dire that was
"searching and deliberate." The jury convicted the defendant of capital murder but rejected the
Commonwealth's request for a death sentence and sentenced him to life without parole. Rob
Sexton, Racial Justice Act: Capital Trial of African American in Barren County Results in Life
Without Parole Sentence, THE ADVOCATE, Sept. 2003, at 14, available at http://dpa.ky.gov/library/
advocate/ sept03/racialjustice.htm (last visited May 10, 2004).
226. One defender stated: "[T]he RJA gives credence to racial arguments we make. I have
had racial issues arise before the [A]ct where it would have been nice to have the [Alct as a back
up." Neal, supra note 24, at 16.
227. Id. at 17.
228. "[T]he prosecutors are aware now that their actions will be monitored more closely.
Thus, they do not even want the possible perception that the death penalty is being sought based
upon the race of the defendant." Id. at 18.
229. In the view of one defender, "I think the Attorney General's office, for example, is very
careful to avoid the 'Racist' label .... " Id. at 16.
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There is a belief, especially in large interracial counties, with murder
defendants and murder victims of different races, that the statute cre-
ates an incentive for prosecutors to: (a) file death notices in all death-
eligible cases; and (b) refuse negotiated plea overtures, all as a way of
ensuring racial balance in their charging statistics.230 The opinion of
another defender is that the bottom line has been an increase in the
number of death sentences sought and imposed.231
The second part of our Kentucky inquiry focused on death-sentenc-
ing outcomes before and after the effective date of the RJA (July 15,
1998). The results indicate that after that date prosecutors and juries
continued to charge and impose death sentences. Indeed, during the
five years before the Act was adopted, an average of 2.6 sentences per
annum were imposed (n = 13), while in the five-year post-Act period,
the figure was 2.8 (n = 14),232 an 8% (1/13) increase in the total num-
ber of death sentences imposed. 233 If one limits the before and after
comparison to "initial" prosecutions, THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF 3
post-Act death sentences, which REPRESENTS A 33% (3/9) increase. 234
230. "[P]rosecutors have adopted policies of pursuing death in every eligible case, rather than
making a case by case determination." Id. at 16.
231. Id. at 16.
232. The pre-Act period embraces 1993 through 1997 and 1998 through July 14, 1998, while
the post-Act period includes the remaining five months of 1998 and 1999 through 2003. In con-
trast, during the fifteen-year period 1977 through 1992, the annual number was 3.6 (n = 54). The
thirteen death sentences imposed in the five years before the RJA were: Ralph Baze, Sammy
Fields, Robert Foley (first murder), Robert Foley (second murder), Randy Haight (retrial),
Benny Lee Hodge (retrial), Dan Johnson, John Mills, Ernest Rogers, Vince Stopher, Frank
Tamme (retrial), W. Eugene Thompson (retrial), and Gerald Young. DEP'T OF PuB. ADVO-
CACY, PERSONS IN KENTUCKY WHO HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH AS OF MAY 6, 2004
(2004) (on file with authors).
233. The Fourteen death sentences (with Kentucky Supreme Court citation if available) im-
posed in the five years post-Act were: Caudill and Goforth v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635
(KY. 2003) (death sentenced co-defendants); Epperson (retrial); Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95
S.w.3d 34 (KY. 2003) (first trial); Garland v. Commonwealth, 2003 WL 22429532 KY (KY.
2004); Gary McKinney; Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W. 234 (KY. 2001); Parrish v. Com-
monwealth, 121 S. W.3d 198 (KY. 2003); David L. Skaggs (retrial); Michael St. Clair (first mur-
der); Michael St. Clair (retrial for first murder); Miguel Soto; Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S.
W.3d 173 (KY. 2003); and Robert K. Woodall. Two death sentences have also been imposed in
2004-Fred Furnish (retrial) and Sammy Fields (retrial). DEP'T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, supra note
232.
234. There were nine initial prosecutions in the pre-Act period and twelve in the post-Act
period. Bette Niemi of the Department of Public Advocacy argues that in Kentucky, retried
capital cases (after judicial vacation of the first death sentence) may be at greater risk of result-
ing in a death sentence because Kentucky jurors in the second trial sometimes have knowledge
of the first death sentence imposed in the case. Niemi E-mail, supra note 219. The pre-Act
sample referred to in the text included four retrials, whereas only two of the fourteen post-Act
death sentences were retrials (Epperson and Skaggs).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Therefore, regardless of the data one examines, the RJA clearly did
not "erase" capital punishment in Kentucky. 35
It is interesting to note, however, that the post-Act increase of
death sentences from nine to twelve among initial prosecutions is sig-
nificantly explained by a greater willingness of prosecutors and juries
in the state's two largest judicial districts (Jefferson and Fayette) 236 to
seek and impose death sentences in black-victim cases, an outcome
that is consistent with the perceptions of the public defenders sur-
veyed in 2002.
Historically, death sentencing in both of these circuits has been in-
frequent and substantially limited to white-victim cases. During the
period 1977 through 1998, fifteen death sentences (80% with white
victims) were imposed in Louisville and six were imposed in Lexing-
ton (all with white victims). It is noteworthy, therefore, that in the
five years after the RJA became effective, the only two death
sentences imposed in Lexington involved white defendants with black
victims. 237 Furthermore, from 1977 through 1998, Louisville saw a to-
tal of only two death sentences imposed in black on black crimes
(which constitutes 13% (2/15) of the total, while in the five years after
the RJA became law, the only two death sentences imposed in Louis-
ville involved black on black murders.238 The data are also consistent
with the perceptions of defenders in smaller, overwhelmingly white
communities. Specifically, in the five years post-RJA, all of the death
sentences imposed outside Lexington and Louisville (n = 12) involved
white victims.
Although the sample sizes in this analysis are small, the consistency
between the perceptions of the public defender respondents and the
before and after data suggest, that in the large communities with both
black- and white-victim cases, the RJA is producing more evenhanded
results, while in the smaller, predominantly white communities, the
law appears to have had little or no effect on the frequency of death
sentencing in white-victim cases.239 However, as predicted by some
235. Kentucky has seen only two executions since 1977, Eddie Lee Harper (white) and Harold
McQueen (white), but there is no way to attribute the small number of executions or the race of
those executed to the RJA.
236. These are the two Kentucky cities with populations greater than 250,000.
237. Caudill, 120 S.W.3d 635. Also, the post-Act period saw no Louisville death sentences
imposed in black-on-white killings, which accounted for 33% (5/15) of the death sentences im-
posed there between 1977 and 1998 in cases with known race data.
238. Parrish, 121 S.W.3d 198; Wheeler, 121 S.W.3d 173.
239. What we cannot tell from these data is whether the outcomes in the metropolitan areas
reflect more evenhanded treatment of similarly situated white and black victim death-eligible
cases or disproportionately more punitive charging practices in black-victim cases, without re-
gard to the comparative culpability of the white- and black-victim cases. We would hope that the
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public defenders, the state's two large interracial circuits (Louisville
and Lexington) have seen an increase in the number of death
sentences imposed in black-victim murders.
Overall, the impact of Kentucky's RJA is mixed. It has certainly
not ended the death penalty in the state; in fact, the number of death
sentences has increased slightly. Nor has it produced judicial orders
barring capital prosecutions. In Louisville and Lexington, where there
are both black and white defendants and victims in the death-eligible
cases, the small number of such cases has limited the potential of sta-
tistical proof; in the rest of the state there are even fewer death-eligi-
ble cases and they typically involve white defendants and white
victims. It also appears that judicial resistance and concern about stig-
matizing prosecutors has limited the capacity of defense counsel to
obtain discovery orders requiring prosecutors to: (a) disclose office
charging policy, and (b) explain on a case-by-case basis the factual
basis of their prior prosecutorial charging decisions. Concerns about
the stigmatizing effect of even raising an RJA claim have also deterred
some defense counsel from using the legislation.
Nevertheless, the RJA appears to have had positive effects as a
symbolic condemnation of race discrimination and a commitment of
the state to maintain a race-neutral decision-making process. There is
also evidence that the symbol has sensitized some prosecutors to race
issues; for some prosecutors, the possibility of their charging practices
being viewed as "racist," or even disclosed to the public, has had a
deterrent effect by creating incentives for race-neutral decision mak-
ing. Such perceptions may partly explain why all four post-RJA death
sentences imposed in Lexington and Louisville have involved black
victims. Moreover, post-RJA, statewide, no death sentence has been
imposed in a black-defendant/white-victim case.
Kentucky's experience with its RJA has five policy lessons. The
first is that concerns about the stigmatization of individual prosecutors
would be considerably reduced if the issue under the statute were not
whether the prosecutorial decision in a defendant's case was racially
motivated, but rather whether: (a) all of the evidence in the case es-
tablished that there is a risk that the decision-making "practices" in
"evenhanded treatment" hypothesis explains the outcomes, but a test of that hypothesis requires
data that would enable one to compare the criminal culpability of defendants in black- and
white-victim cases in these two counties. Also, the facts of the four black-victim cases are consis-
tent with the evenhanded treatment hypothesis, because two of the cases involved two victims
(Wheeler and Parrish) and the two codefendants sentenced to death in Louisville (Caudill and
Goforth) violently murdered a helpless seventy-three-year-old victim. If the post-Act outcomes
in Lexington and Louisville reflect a change of policy, the source of the change is most likely in
prosecutorial charging decisions rather than jury sentencing decisions.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the prosecutor's office were influenced by racial consideration, and
(b) the decision in the defendant's case was consistent with those
practices .240
The second lesson is that statistical evidence, except in extremely
large counties (of which there are few in this country), has limited
power as a basis for inferring discriminatory charging practices. Co-
herent scrutiny of decision making in a given jurisdiction requires a
statewide analysis, as background, to determine if the local decision-
making practices are consistent with the statewide pattern. Regularly
updated statewide analyses also enable the courts and the state legis-
lature to identify structural features of the system and specific case
categories that may be the source of any race effects identified in the
system. 241
The third lesson from Kentucky is that maintenance of a database
and the provision of the expertise required to document statewide
charging patterns are beyond the capacity of defense counsel. This
responsibility should be the obligation of a state agency, such as the
state supreme court or a state commission on law enforcement and
criminal justice. 242
The fourth lesson from Kentucky is that prosecutorial incentives to
deliver evenhanded justice will be enhanced if defendants have, in
pretrial discovery, an absolute right to depose prosecutors about of-
fice charging policies and the factual bases of their prior charging deci-
sions-whenever there exists a statistically based race disparity either
in the local jurisdiction or statewide, regardless of its statistically sig-
nificance, or there is other evidence that suggests a risk of discrimina-
tory charging practices, or both circumstances exist. This right would
enhance the transparency of the charging process and keep the issue
of evenhanded justice foremost in the minds of responsible prosecu-
tors.2 43  The court's final inference of whether there is a risk that a
240. This is the model proposed by Florida Chief Justice Barkett in Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d
455, 468 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (The question is
whether the defendant has established that "discrimination exists [in the office of the prosecutor]
and that there is a strong likelihood it has influenced the State to seek the death penalty" in the
defendant's case.). Also, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its "systemic" reviews focuses on
the "risk of racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty." State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d
1059 (N.J. 1992) (emphasis added). See infra note 249.
241. Such analyses may reveal that jury decision making as contrasted to prosecutorial deci-
sion making is the source of a problem that has been identified or that the race effects are
located among cases with only one or two statutory aggravating circumstances. See supra note
166 and accompanying text.
242. Two state supreme courts, New Jersey and New York, currently provide this support.
243. This right of discovery would be analogous to the right of a defendant challenging the use
of peremptory challenges as racially motivated, who creates a prima facie case based on race
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discriminatory charging policy exists, therefore, would be informed by
statistical evidence, local and statewide, the prosecutor's testimony
about the office's charging policy and the basis for prior charging deci-
sions, and any other evidence suggesting that a discriminatory policy
may exist.
The final lesson from Kentucky is that oversight of a capital sen-
tencing system, (through the enforcement of an RJA or systemic re-
views by a state supreme court), should monitor the effects of both
prosecutorial charging and jury sentencing decisions. 244 This will en-
hance the likelihood that death-sentencing outcomes among all death-
eligible cases are evenhanded.
2. New Jersey's System of Systemic Oversight and Review
We discussed above 245 the New Jersey Supreme Court's efforts to
limit death sentencing to the most aggravated cases through propor-
tionality reviews in individual cases, a process that is also likely to
reduce significantly the risk of race discrimination. The court has
gone beyond prevention, however, and announced in 1992 its willing-
ness to adjudicate claims of systemic race discrimination in the sys-
tem. 246 The court's system of oversight is based on the database that
it uses in its proportionality reviews and is informed by the analyses of
its special master for proportionality review, who prepares periodic
reports247 based on the results of statistical analyses prepared for him
by expert consultants. 248 These systemic review procedures provide
the New Jersey court with good oversight of the operation of its sys-
tem and the basis for meaningful review of claims of systemic race
disparities in the use of peremptories in his case. Upon this showing, the prosecutor must ex-
plain the basis of all strikes challenged in the cases.
244. This is the approach in both the New Jersey and New York systems.
245. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
246. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059.
247. Proportionality Review (II), 757 A.2d 168 (2000). Recent reports include DAVID C.
BAIME, REPORT To THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
PROJECT 2002-2003 TERM (2003). Similar reports were issued by Judge Baime for the 2001-2002
term, July 8, 2002, and for the 1999-2000 term, December 1, 1999.
248. The special master's consultants, since 1993, have been Professor David Weisburd, He-
brew University of Jerusalem, and Professor Joseph Naus, Rutgers University. They routinely
submit a "Technical Appendix" to the master's report, which includes the results of their statisti-
cal analyses with supporting data. The special master also has the benefit of expert reports sub-
mitted from time to time by experts engaged by the Attorney General and the Office of the
Public Defender. In addition, the special master, working with the staff of the Administrative
Office of the New Jersey Courts, periodically updates the court's database, which is made availa-
ble to the parties for further analysis. See also Baime supra note 190, at 263-314 (providing an
excellent overview of death penalty race issues in the New Jersey court including an extensive
presentation of data and analysis).
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discrimination that have been presented to it.249 Although no race
claims have been upheld,250 the review process symbolizes the court's
commitment to evenhanded justice and is likely to sensitize conscien-
tious prosecutors to the factual bases of their charging decisions,
thereby minimizing the risk of race discrimination.
In the eleven years that the New Jersey court has monitored its sys-
tem for evidence of race discrimination, including the adjudication of
discrimination claims, the death penalty has not been erased in New
Jersey. To be sure, as noted above, 251 the number of death sentences
has declined since 1992, but the most plausible explanation for this
trend is enhanced selectivity in prosecutorial charging decisions. So
far as we can tell, the court's willingness to hear race claims has had
no impact whatever on the number of death sentences imposed.2 52
249. Since State v. Marshall first addressed the racial issue in 1992, the question has been
whether the claimant has established a "risk of racial disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty." The focus of this inquiry has been on both prosecutorial charging and jury sentencing
decisions. What appears to have changed during the 1990s is the burden of proof required to
establish an actionable "risk" of systemic discrimination. The original requirement, which called
for proof of a "substantial discriminatory effect," evolved into a requirement that the claimant
must "relentlessly document" the risk of discrimination. There is disagreement in the court
about whether this more recent formulation merely calls for multiple and different controls for
offender culpability or whether it represents a "slow but steady movement from the notion of
risk to the notion of certainty in terms of the quantum of evidence necessary to prove race
effect." Proportionality Review (I), 757 A.2d at 180 (Long, J., dissenting). Certainly, one plau-
sible interpretation of the cases is that relief is not likely to be forthcoming short of evidence
with inferential force comparable to petitioner's proof in McCleskey v. Kemp.
250. The first critique of jury death sentencing, which embraced the pre-1991 cases, produced
some suggestion of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimination, BALDUS, supra note
195, at tbls. 18, 18A. In addition, the reports of successor masters for proportionality review
have documented some race effects in the system, but the court has not considered them to be
sufficiently strong to require corrective action. However, because of the methodological limita-
tions of the evidence thus far presented and the mixed substantive findings in those data, the
court has not given the system a clean bill of health: "Our implementation of this monitoring
system does not imply either the presence or the absence of a race effect in capital sentencing.
No reliable demonstration has been made to date that racial discrimination improperly affects
the administration of the death penalty in this state." Proportionality Review (I), 757 A.2d at
179. The justices do not unanimously share this view, however. Justice Handler believes that a
"constitutionally impermissible risk" of race discrimination has been established (State v. Har-
vey, 731 A.2d 1121, 1161 (1999); State v. Cooper, 731 A.2d 1000, 1069 (1999)) and Justice Long
believes that there is a "sufficient question about race effect in white victim cases, although not
enough to meet the relentless documentation standard" to justify a judicially imposed morato-
rium on executions until statistics are "compiled to the point of relentlessness." Proportionality
Review (11) 757 A.2d at 182.
251. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
252. There have been no executions in New Jersey during the eleven years since the New
Jersey court fully affirmed State v. Marshall in 1992. The delay in Marshall's execution and in the
executions of the numerous other defendants whose death sentences have been finally approved
by the New Jersey Supreme Court since 1992, are the product of state postconviction and federal
habeas appeals; they are completely unrelated to the court's oversight of the New Jersey system
for evidence of race discrimination.
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Moreover, there is no evidence of the use of quotas or the adoption of
blanket charging to improve prosecutorial charging statistics. Indeed,
throughout the decade, the data have continued to reveal race-of-vic-
tim effects in charging decisions, but not sufficiently strong to warrant
judicial relief.2 53
The experiences of New Jersey and Kentucky clearly indicate that
the practice of hearing and adjudicating race claims has not meant the
end of capital punishment or a material impairment of its use. Nor
has the practice dramatically changed the racial composition of death
row through the application of quotas or the adoption of blanket
charging practices designed to improve the charging statistics.254
The experiences also reveal definite limits on the capacity of courts
to address racial issues. A major constraint is political, particularly at
the trial court level, at which concerns about stigmatization affect all
of the key actors. 255 The New Jersey and Kentucky experiences viv-
idly demonstrate the important role that rich data play in informing
judicial oversight and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in com-
munities where race is an important issue. Only with good data can
conscientious prosecutors assess whether race (consciously or uncon-
sciously) is a factor in their decision making. This process of learning
and evaluation offers significant promise of inducing race-neutral
prosecutorial decision making. The Kentucky and New Jersey exper-
iences also suggest the importance of systemic approaches based on
253. See supra note 145. These race-of-victim disparities would not persist under a quota-
driven system designed to minimize race-of-victim effects in the special master's charging
statistics.
254. It is not clear what would occur if courts routinely sustained race claims, which would
place prosecutors under considerably greater pressure to maintain a more evenhanded system
than currently exists in either Kentucky or New Jersey. Nevertheless, the experience of these
two states in the 1990s supports the belief that recognition of a legal right may have salutary
effects even in the absence of an "active remedy." Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1436 (Recognition
of a legal right without a meaningful remedy may: (a) provide the "basis for criticizing a given
social practice," (b) "serve as a magnet around which to organize dissatisfaction," and (c) "cata-
lyze, in unforeseen ways, the remedial capabilities of other sectors of the society."). Similar
effects are perceived to flow from the International Covenant of Human Rights, which articu-
lates rights but provides no means for their implementation. Burns Weston, Human Rights, EN-
CYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (15th rev. ed. 2002) at 13, available at http:www.britannica.com/eb/
article?eu=109242&tocid=O &query = human%20rights ("The Universal Declaration... is not a
treaty. It was meant to proclaim 'a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations' rather than enforceable legal obligations. Nevertheless, [it] has acquired a status juridi-
cally more important than originally intended, and it has been widely used, even by national
courts, as a means of judging compliance with human rights obligations under the UN
Charter.").
255. Blume et al. supra note 91, reports a similar experience in the presentation of post-Mc-
Cleskey claims of discrimination in state and federal courts. The political aspect of these cases is
what most clearly distinguishes them from the judicial review of claims of race discrimination in
civil settings, such as employment and housing.
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good statewide data under the scrutiny of appellate courts that are
removed from the personal relationships that burden the process at
the local level. Systemic remedies also avoid the stigmatization and
political risks associated with findings that individual charging and
sentencing decisions were based on racial considerations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The record of empirical research, since Furman v. Georgia was de-
cided in 1972, documents four important points about race discrimina-
tion in the use of the death penalty that bear on the legitimacy of
capital punishment today.
First, race discrimination is not inherent in the institution of capital
punishment despite widespread perceptions to the contrary. How-
ever, among the general public, perceptions of the widespread exis-
tence of discrimination do not appear to affect adversely the
perceived legitimacy of the system nationwide.
Second, well-controlled studies have documented race discrimina-
tion in a number of individual jurisdictions. However, among the at-
tentive public, which closely observes the operation of death penalty
systems and is aware of the empirical evidence on the issue, there is
disagreement about its legal and moral significance, especially as it
relates to race-of-victim discrimination.
Third, the only way to determine if a risk of race discrimination
exists in the death penalty of a given jurisdiction is through the con-
duct of a well-controlled study of its application. In the absence of
results from such a study, which document the absence of significant
adjusted race effects, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over the system.
For people who view race discrimination as unlawful and immoral,
this uncertainty impairs the legitimacy of a death penalty system. The
removal of such uncertainty has been the motivating force behind
publicly financed studies (and requests therefore) in a number states
and in the federal government. If a study documents a risk of discrim-
ination in a system, in our judgment, the legitimacy of the system is
impaired if action is not taken to prevent it or correct it, or both.
Fourth, the evidence suggests that procedures to prevent and cor-
rect race discrimination can be applied without erasing or materially
impairing the use of capital punishment. Preventive measures exist in
New Jersey, Florida, Nebraska (comparative proportionality review),
and in the United States Department of Justice (prosecutorial screen-
ing of death-eligible cases). One purpose of these review procedures
is to limit death sentencing to the worst cases, which the evidence sug-
gests can be done without materially impairing the use of the death
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penalty. In our judgment, the successful application of such proce-
dures enhances the legitimacy of their respective death penalty
systems.
Another way to remove the cloud of uncertainty over a death pen-
alty system is to authorize race claims for adjudication under reasona-
ble standards of review. The systemic review procedure in New Jersey
and the system of individual case review in Kentucky represent impor-
tant steps in this direction and appear to reduce the risk of race dis-
crimination. Moreover, they neither erase nor materially impair the
use of the death penalty. In our judgment, therefore, the legitimacy of
a given death penalty system depends in important part on the extent
to which it provides defendants the opportunity to present race claims
for adjudication under reasonable standards of review.
VI. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Race Discrimination Pre-Furman256
Before Furman v. Georgia was decided in 1972, the legitimacy of
capital punishment in America was significantly impaired by a percep-
tion of widespread discrimination against black defendants, particu-
larly in the South. That perception was consistent with the available
evidence, which also revealed race-of-victim discrimination. It was a
perception shared by both the general public and the attentive public.
The images and understanding from this period also appear to have
shaped perceptions of death sentencing in the post-Furman period.
B. Race Discrimination Post-Furman257
The evidence from the post-Furman period tells a different story. It
reveals that while the discriminatory application of the death penalty
continues to occur in some places, it does not appear to be inherent in
the system, in other words, it is not an inevitable feature of all Ameri-
can death-sentencing systems. Specifically, the post-Furman data re-
veal only spotty evidence of systemic black-defendant discrimination.
However, we do find in a few of the jurisdictions for which data are
available that black defendants with white victims are at greater risk
than are white defendants with white victims and all defendants whose
victims are black. We also find, in a number of jurisdictions, but
clearly not all, that the pre-Furman pattern of race-of-victim discrimi-
nation persists in the post-Furman period, principally the product of
prosecutorial charging decisions.
256. See supra pp. 1415-17, 1423.
257. See supra pp. 1417-26.
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C. The General Public's Perception of Discrimination25 8
In spite of this post-Furman evidence, the general public perceives
only one form of discrimination-that against black defendants-and
believes it is widespread. There are several reasons for this mis-
perception. Most important is the power of pre-Furman inspired "or-
dinary knowledge," which is reinforced by the common belief that
most of our institutions discriminate on the basis of race. The litera-
ture clearly suggests that statistical studies to the contrary, no matter
how well executed, are unlikely to change such widely held beliefs.
There are at least four additional explanations for the gap between
the findings of the specialized research and public perceptions. One is
the ease with which both black and white citizens are able to under-
stand why such discrimination exists. Another is the superficial ap-
peal of data advanced by death penalty abolitionists, comparing the
40% representation rate of blacks on death row with the 13% black
share of the general population. A third reason is the mistaken belief
that commonly reported evidence of race-of-victim discrimination is,
in fact, further evidence of the existence of race-of-defendant discrim-
ination. Finally, there are occasional credible studies documenting
black-defendant discrimination and frequent reports by practitioners
that such discrimination exists, all of which reinforce the popular un-
derstanding of widespread race-of-defendant discrimination.
D. The General Public's Indifference to Race Discrimination259
The public's perception of discrimination against black defendants
does not appear, however, to impair materially the public's perception
of the legitimacy of capital punishment, although public opinion polls
on the issue are not entirely clear. One possible explanation for this is
that the public is indifferent to all forms of race discrimination. This
seems implausible given the public's concern about racial profiling in
police stops of drivers and pedestrians. For citizens who generally
perceive real costs associated with race discrimination in society, more
plausible reasons for indifference in the death penalty context are: (a)
a difficulty of seeing condemned killers as "victims," (b) a resignation
to the inevitability of the discriminatory practices and a belief that any
remedy for the problem may enable black offenders to escape their
just deserts, and (c) a belief that tolerance of discrimination is an ac-
ceptable price to pay in order to preserve the benefits of capital pun-
258. See supra pp. 1426-34.
259. See supra pp. 1434-40.
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ishment. In short, race discrimination, even if unfortunate, is
perceived to be a necessary evil required to deliver justice.
The public's indifference to race discrimination in the use of the
death penalty is enhanced by the conduct of the public officials who
are responsible for dealing with such issues. An understandable re-
sponse of the average citizen is that the role of race in the use the
death penalty is no problem if elected officials and courts do not con-
sider the issue a matter of concern. In contrast, reports of the con-
demnation of race discrimination by courts and state attorneys general
in employment and racial profiling commonly highlight the impor-
tance of evenhanded treatment in these areas.
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp has had a
significant impact in this regard. First, the court's opinion obscures
the subtle manner in which systemic unconscious discrimination oc-
curs. It also trivializes the significance of discrimination based on ra-
cial "empathy" as contrasted to racial "hostility." Second, it has
removed the issue entirely from the federal courts and has greatly re-
duced the willingness of state courts and legislatures to address the
issue.
E. The Attentive Public's Perception of Race Discrimination260
The attentive public recognizes the distinction between race-of-de-
fendant and race-of-victim discrimination. These observers generally
perceive race-of-defendant discrimination as both unconstitutional
and immoral and they correctly perceive it as far less of a problem
than it was pre-Furman. Indeed, the post-Furman decline of race-of-
defendant discrimination has generally enhanced the perceived legiti-
macy of the system. However, in the few situations in which race-of-
defendant discrimination has been reasonably well established, the ev-
idence has been taken seriously (for example, by an official Penn-
sylvania commission, which called for a moratorium on executions),
although, thus far, not by any courts.
In contrast to the spotty evidence of systemic race-of-defendant dis-
crimination, there is convincing evidence of a pattern and practice of
race-of-victim discrimination in a number of states. Most legal com-
mentators have condemned race-of-victim discrimination in the same
terms as race-of-defendant discrimination-as a race-based distortion
of the system that offends not only the Constitution but also basic
principles of comparative justice. In spite of the unconstitutionality of
260. See supra pp. 1440-46.
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race-of-victim discrimination, in the eyes of some prosecutors, courts,
scholars, and other observers, it does not present a serious problem.
F. Arguments Advanced to Diminish the Significance of
Race-of-Victim Discrimination261
Three arguments have been advanced to diminish the significance
of race-of-victim discrimination. One claim is that there is insufficient
evidence of either conscious or unconscious race-of-victim discrimina-
tion to be a matter of concern. Some argue that because of the com-
plexity of the decision-making processes involved, such discrimination
is impossible to detect. Others argue that the documented race-of-
victim disparities are a naturally occurring outcome of an evenhanded
race-neutral decision-making process. We believe that race-of-victim
discrimination can be detected in properly controlled empirical stud-
ies and that the disparities documented in a number of such studies
are the product of conscious or unconscious racial empathy by largely
white prosecutors and jurors, who view crimes against black victims as
less aggravated than similar crimes against white victims.
It is also argued, that for three reasons, race-of-victim discrimina-
tion is less objectionable on moral grounds than race-of-defendant dis-
crimination. The arguments turn on distinctions between the victims
and beneficiaries of the two forms of discrimination. The first claim is
that because race-of-victim discrimination is not triggered by the de-
fendant's race, it does not implicate the traditional goal of antidis-
crimination law, which is to protect minorities from adverse treatment
because of their race. The second claim is that victim-based race dis-
crimination is less objectionable because the beneficiaries of it are
principally black, rather than white, defendants. The third claim is
that a defendant in a white-victim case who is sentenced to death be-
cause of his victim's race has no moral ground to object because he
freely choose his victim.
We consider these arguments unpersuasive because they do not ad-
dress the core bases of the immorality of race-of-victim discrimina-
tion, which are: (a) its undervaluation of black lives, (b) its distortion
of the decision-making process on the basis of race, (c) the fact that
the victim's race is a "but for" cause of many death sentences and
executions, (d) the unfairness it visits upon black communities, and
(e) the unseemly message it sends that the overriding objective of cap-
ital punishment in America is the protection of white people.
261. See supra pp. 1446-53.
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G. The Claim That Tolerance of Discrimination is Necessary to
Protect and Maintain the Benefits of Capital Punishment262
It is also argued that even if both race-of-defendant and race-of-
victim discrimination are morally objectionable, it is "necessary" to
tolerate them in order to maintain the benefits of capital punishment.
In short, acquiescence, although regrettable, is justified on the ground
of necessity. This justification, which is strongly implicit in Justice
Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, rests on two beliefs.
The first is that race discrimination in the use of the death penalty is
inevitable and widespread. The second is that race discrimination is
ineradicable, which means that the prevention and correction of race
discrimination is impossible without erasing or materially impairing
the benefits of capital punishment. From this perspective, if federal
law were to provide a vehicle for capital defendants to present and
adjudicate race claims, the death penalty systems of thirty-eight states
would be brought to their knees under an onslaught of race claims.
Far better, the logic goes, to tolerate a less than perfect system than to
eviscerate capital punishment nationwide in the name of equal justice.
We believe that the evidence from the post-Furman period draws into
serious question each of the beliefs on which the necessity claim is
based.
1. Evidence of the Inevitability of Discrimination263
The first belief underlying the necessity claim is that race discrimi-
nation is widespread, inevitable, and irremediable. However, the evi-
dence suggests that, in the post-Furman period: (a) systemic race-of-
defendant discrimination is very much the exception rather than the
rule, and (b) while race-of-victim discrimination continues to exist in a
number of places, it is far from universal. The literature clearly estab-
lishes that systemic race discrimination is not inherent in all post-
Furman death penalty systems. Whether or not it exists depends on
the racial composition of the defendants and victims in death-eligible
cases, local culture, jury selection processes, charging and sentencing
procedures, and the presence or absence of procedures designed to
limit the risk of discrimination.
262. See supra p. 1454.
263. See supra pp. 1455-56.
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2. Evidence that Meaningful Efforts to Prevent and Correct the
Effects of Race Discrimination Will Erase or Materially
Impair the Use of the Death Penalty
With respect to the second premise of the necessity argument, post-
Furman research suggests that the risk of race discrimination can be
substantially reduced without eviscerating capital punishment. We
have examined two approaches that bear on this issue. First are judi-
cial and prosecutorial procedures designed to limit death sentencing
to the worst cases. Second are judicial and legislative procedures that
permit the presentation and adjudication of race claims.
a. Limiting Capital Punishment to the Most Aggravated Cases264
It has been known for some time that the most effective means of
reducing the risk of race discrimination is a limitation of death sen-
tencing to the most culpable offenders. Moreover, research indicates
that these death sentences are the most likely to be affirmed and car-
ried out with an actual execution. Limiting the death penalty to the
most aggravated cases, therefore, has only a marginal impact on the
goals of capital punishment while dramatically reducing the risk of
race discrimination in the system. The attainment of this goal raises
three issues of feasibility-methodological, substantive, and political.
Methodological feasibility concerns the ability of prosecutors and
judges to identify the most aggravated cases. Prosecutors, of course,
have a vast body of experience on which to base such judgments.
Moreover, recent experience in the Florida Supreme Court and in the
Nebraska trial courts suggests that the number of statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances provides a very good straightforward measure for
courts to use in identifying the most aggravated cases.
On the issue of substantive and political feasibility, we have evi-
dence from the comparative proportionality review systems in the su-
preme courts of New Jersey and Florida and in the trial courts of
Nebraska. We also have evidence from the United States Department
of Justice's procedures for the systematic screening of death-eligible
cases. The experience in these jurisdictions suggests that the effective-
ness of such procedures depends on four things: (a) the richness of the
available data, (b) the perceived reasonableness of the review stan-
dards, (c) the transparency of the database and the process of deci-
sion, and (d) the visibility and political risk associated with the review
process. These case studies suggest that prosecutors operating with
low visibility are in the strongest position to limit death sentencing to
264. See supra pp. 1456-66.
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the worst cases with low political risk. This result appears to hold
whether the prosecutorial screening process is informal (New Jersey
and Nebraska) or formal (the federal review system). The evidence
also suggests that reviewing courts, at both the trial and appellate
court levels, have the capacity to influence prosecutorial decision
making through informal feedback mechanisms based on systems of
proportionality review that are data-rich, well reasoned, and transpar-
ent. These features give the review process legitimacy. When propor-
tionality reviews are conducted at the appellate level, which gives
them high visibility, the number of death sentences actually vacated as
excessive is tempered by the state's political environment with respect
of capital punishment.
b. Evidence on the Adjudication of Race Claims2 65
We also have experience in the 1990s with two state procedures
(New Jersey and Kentucky) designed to adjudicate claims of discrimi-
nation. The New Jersey court scrutinizes its system for evidence of
systemic discrimination, while the Kentucky system, under its Racial
Justice Act, focuses on prosecutorial charging decisions in individual
cases. The evidence from these states does not support the belief that
the application of such systems will erase the death penalty or sub-
stantially impair its utility. The evidence also fails to support the belief
that such oversight procedures will result in either the use of quotas or
the adoption of blanket charging practices applied without regard to
the criminal culpability of defendants, for the purpose of improving
prosecutorial charging statistics. In both jurisdictions, the courts have
applied conservative standards in evaluating discrimination claims ap-
parently out of concerns with the stigmatizing effects and political
repercussions that a finding of race discrimination would produce. No
judicial relief has been granted in either state on such a claim.
Nevertheless, the review systems appear to have had positive ef-
fects, first at a symbolic level as a condemnation of race discrimination
and a commitment of the state to maintain a race-neutral decision-
making process. The systems may also have had a deterrent effect by
sensitizing some prosecutors to race issues. The possibility of their
charging practices being viewed as "racist," or even disclosed to the
public, may have created incentives for race-neutral charging
practices.
The Kentucky and New Jersey experiences also demonstrate the im-
portance of focusing the review process on a systemic statewide "risk"
265. See supra pp. 1466-78.
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of discrimination (both systemically and in individual cases), rather
than on the fact of discrimination in individual cases, which is almost
impossible to prove. The risk approach, especially if applied by an
appellate court on a statewide basis, reduces the stigmatization associ-
ated with charging an individual prosecutor with race discrimination.
The New Jersey and Kentucky systems also demonstrate the impor-
tance of a statewide publicly funded database that is available to the
parties. Defense counsel lack the financing to develop such a re-
source. Also, when the law limits the court's focus to charging and
sentencing decisions in a single county, or judicial district, statistical
analysis is possible in only massive urban areas (which would have a
sufficient sample size). Moreover, the single county approach effec-
tively excludes from the review process the great bulk of counties in
which defendants and victims are virtually all Caucasian.
H. The Implications of Ignoring the Issue of Race Discrimination
for the Legitimacy of Death Sentencing Systems 266
Experience has shown that the only way to determine if a risk of
race discrimination exists in a given death-sentencing jurisdiction is
through the conduct of a well-controlled empirical study of the appli-
cation of its capital charging and sentencing system. In the absence of
results from such a study documenting the absence of any risk of race
discrimination, a cloud of moral uncertainty hangs over the system.
The evidence also suggests that procedures to prevent and correct
race discrimination can be applied without erasing or materially im-
pairing the use of capital punishment. Therefore, unless a well-con-
trolled study documents that a death penalty system carries no risk of
discrimination, its legitimacy depends in important part on the extent
to which it applies procedures to limit death sentencing to the most
aggravated cases and provides defendants the opportunity to present
race claims for adjudication under reasonable standards of review.
266. See supra pp. 1478-79.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix provides additional statistical evidence on race-of-
defendant and race-of-victim disparities in the pre- and post-Furman
periods.
I. PRE-FURMAN RACE DISPARITIES
Appendix Figure 1 presents four plots estimated in the logistic re-
gression analysis of the pre-Furman data described in the text.267 The
horizontal (x) axis represents the culpability level of the cases, and the
vertical (y) axis indicates the estimated likelihood of a death sentence
being imposed for each case. Each plot presents the estimates for a
different defendant/victim racial combination of cases. For example,
the highest risk of a death sentence is in the black-defendant/white-
victim category of cases (B/W) while the lowest risk is in the white-
defendant/black-victim category (W/W). The black and white dots
represents a life or death sentence imposed in a case. The Figure also
identifies four cases-A, B, C, and D-which have comparable levels
of criminal culpability on the x axis. Both black defendants, A and B,
had a higher estimated probability receiving a death sentence (0.83
and 0.51) than both the white defendants, C and D (0.39 and 0.17).
267. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
LOGISTIC MODEL OF RACE EFFECTS IN PRE-FURMAN GEORGIA
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Culpability Index
Source: David C. Baldus et al., supra note 8, at 142 fig. 20.
II. POST-FURMAN RACE DISPARITIES
Appendix Table 1 presents post-Furman unadjusted race-of-defen-
dant and race-of-victim death-sentencing rates for Georgia (Part I)
and Maryland (Part II). For both Parts, Panel B shows the unadjusted
race-of-defendant disparity, while Panel A shows the unadjusted race-
of-victim effects. Panel C indicates that most crime is intraracial. Be-
cause blacks kill mainly blacks, the lower death-sentencing rate in
black-victim cases (Panel C) draws down the overall death-sentencing
rate for the black-defendants shown in Panel B of both Parts.
[Vol. 53:14111488
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Part I Unadjusted Race-of-Victim and Race-of-Defendant
Disparities in Death-Sentencing Rates, among All
Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter Cases (Post-
Furman Georgia)
Rates and Disparities
A. Race-of-victim disparity
White-victim cases (WV) .11(108/981)
Black-victim cases (BV) .0133 (20/1, 503)
Difference (WV-BV) 10 pts.
Ratio (WV/BV) 8.3
B. Race-of-defendant disparity
Black-defendant cases (BD) .04 (68/1, 676)
White-defendant cases (WD) .07 (60/808)
Difference (BD-WD) -3 pts.
Ratio (BD/WD) .57
C. Defendant/victim racial composition
1. Black defendant/white victim (B/W) .21 (50/233)
2. White defendant/white victim (W/W) .08 (58/748)
3. Black defendant/black victim (B/B) .01 (18/1443)
4. White defendant/black victim (W/B) .03 (2/60)
All cases .05 (128/2484)
Source: BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 315 tbl. 50.
Part II Unadjusted Race-of-Victim and Race-of-Defendant
Disparities in Death-Sentencing Rates among all
Death-Eligible Cases (Maryland, 1978-1999)
Rates and Disparities
A. Race-of-victim disparity
White-victim cases (WV) .12
Black-victim cases (BV) .02
Difference (WV-NWV) 10 pts.
Ratio (WV/NWV) 6.0
(n=1,291)
B. Race-of-defendant disparity
Black-defendant cases (BD) .05
Non-Black-defendant cases (NBD) .07
Difference (BD-NBD) -2 pts.
Ratio (BD/NBD) .71
(n=1,291)
C. Defendant/victim racial composition
1. Black defendant/white victim (B[W) .14
2. White defendant/white victim (W/W) .09
3. Black defendant/black victim (B/B) .03
4. White defendant/black victim (W/B) .05
All cases .06 (76/1311)
Source: PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14, at 88-96 tbls. 2F, 3G, 4G.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
As noted in the text, a handful of studies suggest that, statewide,
black-defendants with white-victims are treated more punitively than
all defendants with different defendant/victim racial combinations.268
The question is the extent to which the disparities in those cases are
driven by race-of-victim or race-of-defendant discrimination. The Ma-
ryland data in Appendix Figure 2 sheds some light on that issue. Part
IA documents an unadjusted 14-percentage point black-defendant/
white-victim disparity. However, Part 1B reveals a 12-point white vic-
tim disparity, suggesting that the 14-point disparity in Part IA is
mainly driven by the 12-point white-victim disparity shown in Part IB.
APPENDIX FIGURE 2
BLACK DEFENDANT/WHITE VICTIM (PART IA), WHITE VICTIM
(PART 1B), AND BLACK DEFENDANT (PART II) DISPARITIES IN
MARYLAND CAPITAL CHARGING AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES
Part I Unadjusted Race Disparities in Death Sentencing Rates
Among Death-Noticed Cases: Maryland, 1979-1999
A.
14pts.
. Black Defendant/White Victim Cases
.21 -- All Other cases
n = (101) (199)
B.
1 12 pts. All White Victim Cases
.29 Other Victim Cases
n = (203) (98)
268. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Part II Adjusted Race of Defendant Disparities in Charging and
Sentencing Outcomes Among All Death Eligible
White-Victim Cases: Maryland, 1978-1999
1. Death Notice Filed by Prosecutor
j14 
pt,
2. Cases Advances to Trial with the State Seeking a Death
Sentence
-3 s
73
3. Penalty Trial with Death Sentence Imposed
S8 Pt.
4. Death Sentence Imposed Among All Death-Eligible Cases
S.
Black Defendants
White Defendants
~1
Sources: Part 1: Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 166, figs. 3, 4.
Part II: PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 14, tbl. 4G.
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Part II of the Figure is helpful because it focuses exclusively on the
white-victim cases and compares adjusted outcomes for the white and
black-defendants whose victims were white. The bottom line in Row
4 shows that the adjusted death-sentencing rate among all death-eligi-
ble white-victim cases, although low, is twice as high for the black de-
fendants as it is for the white defendants. Those two figures can be
usefully compared to the adjusted rate for all black victim cases, which
is 1%.
As noted in the text, a strong black-defendant main effect has been
documented in Philadelphia County penalty trials, principally in the
weighing stage of those trials. 269 Part I of Appendix Figure 3 docu-
ments an unadjusted 12-percentage point race-of-defendant disparity
in death-sentencing rates at the weighing stage of 338 penalty trials
over a 22-year period. The risk of a death sentence is twice as high
(.24/.12) for the black defendants as it is for the non-black defendants.
269. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 3
RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES IN JURY WEIGHING DECISIONS:
PHILADELPHIA 1978-2000
Part I: Unadjusted Black-Defendant Disparity Part 11: Adjusted Black-Defendant Disparities
A. Odds Ratio/Multiplier
from Logistic Regression
Analysis:
12 ps
(69/282) (7/56)
3.8*
B. Comparison of
Adjusted Rates:'
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n= (282) (56)
2. Ratio of Adjusted
Rates (relative risk):
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Legend I E Black-Defendant Cases
Part III: A Plot of Race-of-Defendant and Race-of-Victim Effects Estimated Among Jury Weighing Decisions:
Philadelphia 1978-2000
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1 Death sentencing rates adjusted with a logistic regression-based scale of defendant culpability.
Source: Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 17, figs. 4, 5.
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Parts II and III of Appendix Figure 3 present the results of a mul-
tivariate analysis of these data, with controls for all of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In that analysis, on aver-
age, the odds of the average black defendant's receiving a death sen-
tence were 3.8 times higher (p = .05) than the odds faced by a similarly
culpable non-black defendant. To estimate the practical impact of the
black-defendant disparities, we computed on each level of a culpabil-
ity scale the number of death sentences that would have been imposed
against black defendants if the rate documented for the non-black de-
fendants at that culpability level had been applied to the black defend-
ants. That analysis suggests a substantial proportion of the weighing
stage death sentences imposed against blacks would have been life
sentences if the black defendants had been sentenced at the same
rates as similarly situated non-black defendants.
Interestingly, the race-of-defendant effects that we documented in
Philadelphia are principally the product of jury decision making. Our
analysis of prosecutorial decision making there revealed no race-of-
defendant effects at all. This is consistent with the national pattern,
although as the Maryland data noted above make clear, in some states
black defendants with white victims are at a higher risk of being sen-
tenced to death than white defendants with white victims.
III. RACE DISPARITIES AND OFFENDER
CULPABILITY INTERACTIONS
The data in Appendix Figure 1 show a strong interaction effect be-
tween the criminal culpability of the defendants and both race-of-de-
fendant and race-of-victim effects. For each category of cases, both
race effects are largest in the mid range of cases between culpability
levels 0 and 2 on the horizontal x axis.
A similar pattern holds for the race-of-victim effect documented in
post-Furman Georgia. Appendix Figure 4 contains the Georgia data
on this issue that was presented in McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987.270
These data support the belief that the problem is mainly in the mid
range. However, more recent research suggests that when the mea-
sure of offender culpability is the number of aggravating circum-
stances, the race effects are most prominent among all of the weakly
and moderately aggravated cases, for example., those with one or two
aggravating circumstances. 271
270. Supra note 165.
271. Supra note 166.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 4
RACE-OF-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN BLACK DEFENDANT CASES,
GEORGIA CHARGING AND SENTENCING STUDY, 1973-1979
Part I: Unadjusted Race-of-Victim Disparity
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Part II: Race-of-Victim Disparities After Adjustment for Defendant Culpability in a
Multiple Regression Analysis*
0 95% Confidence Limits
for Mean Death-
_ Sentencing Rate - 1
a: '
0 0
McClesky
0Din
0.4 0.6
Level of Aggression
1 1.2
*The curves represent 95% confidence limits on the average death-sentencing rate at
increasing levels of aggravation (redrawn from computer output). EJDP, supra note 14 at
321, fig. 32.
Source: BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 315 tbl. 50, 321 fig. 32.
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